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INTRODUCTION

The use of foreign law in American constitutional adjudication
has come to the fore in several recent Supreme Court cases.12

Among the most controversial of these cases is Lawrence v. Texas.
Lawrence, which struck down Texas' sodomy law, relied heavily on
foreign legislative and judicial decisions in its eloquent defense of
same-sex intimacy as a species of liberty.
Its tone and use of
foreign law has captured the imagination of gay rights advocates
self-consciously globalizing their fight for greater freedom and
equality. 4 Those very same characteristics have alarmed opponents
of constitutional gay rights claims, who see in Lawrence both an
attack on traditional American cultural values and an abdication of
American
constitutionalism
in
favor
of
a
vaguely
elitist/European/supranational tyranny.5
Still, the notoriety of Lawrence's use of foreign law might seem
perplexing, given that the Supreme Court has been using foreign6
law and citing foreign nations' judicial opinions for a long time.
Thus, an article considering the use of foreign and international
law in gay rights litigation might do well to start by examining the

1. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997).
2. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
3. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-76 (citing Sexual Offenses Act, 1967, c.60, § 1
(Eng.); P.G. &J.H. v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001); Modinos v. Cyprus,
259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988); Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981)).
4. The movement for equal marriage rights for same-sex couples is
especially pertinent here in the United States, as marriage-fights advocates have
consistently celebrated foreign judicial and legislative decisions to allow same-sex
marriage. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. But the globalized push for
gay rights extends beyond marriage to include family protections more generally,
protection for intimate conduct, coverage in employment discrimination laws, and
the right to serve in militaries.
5. See, e.g., Greg Franke, Renegade Judges Undermine Constitution, HUMAN
EVENTs, Sept. 13, 2004 (reviewing PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, SUPREMACISTS: THE TYRANNY
OF JUDGES AND HOW TO STOP IT (2004) and citing, among other troubling

constitutional
trends,
"one
world
globalism"),
http://www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=5066.
6. See, e.g., Raper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198-99 (2005) (citing examples of the
Supreme Court citing foreign legal authority when determining the meaning of
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); see also
Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164151.
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law. 7
reasons for the strong reaction to Lawrence's use of foreign
Lawrence was a controversial opinion, both in the result it reached
and in the means it used. It dealt with a question implicating one
of the main battlegrounds in the current culture wars. The
opinion itself was aggressive, in that it explicitly went out of its way
to rely on a broader and more value-laden grounding-substantive
due process, rather than equal protection -to reach its result,9
even though that meant overruling a relatively recent precedent.
At the same time, Lawrence is remarkably vague. Most readers are
by now familiar with opacity of its legal analysis. Notwithstanding
Justice Kennedy's lyricism about the content of due process liberty
and his deep understanding of what it means to gay men and
Lawrence
lesbians to have their sexual intimacy criminalized,
remains an enigma in terms of the legal rule it lays down.
These characteristics might lead critics to look especially
askance at Lawrence's invocation of foreign law. An aggressive,
vaguely reasoned but highly value-laden opinion on a controversial
subject implicating culture and morality only becomes more
problematic, the thought might go, when it does not even rely on
domestic legal sources to determine the meaning of the governing
law.11 Opponents of gay rights might be especially alarmed when
that foreign law-whether it serves as legal precedent or merely a
model for policy-pushes American law beyond where it would
otherwise go.
Beyond these characteristics, the subtext of a globalized gay
rights movement surely affected the reaction to Lawrence's use of
foreign law. Given the steadily increasing momentum behind gay
rights in foreign nations, 12 opponents of that movement in the
United States must be alarmed by the Court's embrace of rights7. See discussion infra notes 8-36 and accompanying text.
8. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-75.
9. Perhaps to add insult to injury, Lawrence was written by one of the authors
of the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
which is perhaps most notable for its homage to stare decisis. See 505 U.S. 833,
854-69 (1992) (arguing that stare decisis required a refusal to overturn Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
10. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 596-97.
11. Of course, in LawrenceJustice Kennedy was careful to explain how Bowers
v. Hardwick had been wrong on its own terms, given its narrow conceptualization
of the right at issue and its misreading of American history, and had also been
undermined by subsequent domestic precedent. See id. at 566-77 (citing Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
12. See infra notes 252, 254, and 260 and accompanying text.
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protective foreign law partly because that embrace legitimizes
recourse to foreign nations' gay rights policies. If Lawrence used
foreign law to find a constitutional right to same-sex intimacy, the
argument might go, then perhaps that same Court, or Congress, or
the states, will look to foreign statutes and judicial decisions when
deciding whether to recognize other rights, including rights to
marry, to serve in the military, to be free of employment
discrimination, or to adopt or retain parental custody.
This cursory introduction to the issue highlights several factors
that should be considered when determining the appropriateness
of borrowing foreign law in American constitutional litigation.
First is the nature of the constitutional claim. 13 Lawrence was a case
about individual rights. Indeed, it is the very paradigm of such a
case, as individuals sought to obtain constitutional protection from
the State entering their home and branding them criminals based
on their performance of the most intimate of conduct. 14 The
universality of the individual freedom that Justice Kennedy
identified in Lawrence15 seems at first glance clearly relevant to the
question whether foreign law should play a role in adjudicating
that claim. Therefore, one factor to consider when determining
the appropriateness of foreign law borrowing in a case such as
Lawrence is whether the individual-rights nature of the issue
universalizes the issue, making foreign law an appropriate source of
meaning when interpreting the Constitution.
But the simple fact that a constitutional provision is amenable
to foreign borrowing does not make the affirmative argument in
favor of such borrowing. Indeed, as suggested by the response to
the court's use of foreign law in cases such as Lawrence
and Roper,
17
16
such borrowing remains controversial among judges, scholars,
and more general commentators.
It may be, though, that foreign
law can play a role more modest than actually supplying or even
influencing the rule of decision in American constitutional cases.
In particular, foreign law can provide empirical evidence relevant
to American constitutional analysis or provide decisional aids that
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See infra Parts III.A-B.
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-63.
See id. at 562.
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1217 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., John McGinnis, The Limits of InternationalLaw in ProtectingDignity,

27 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137 (2003).

18. Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, POL'Y REV., June
2005, availableat http://www.policyreview.org/jun05/anderson.html.
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help American courts approximate the rule required by the
Constitution.
As the author has argued elsewhere, American courts
adjudicating constitutional claims often find it quite difficult to
discern what the Constitution would actually require in a particular
case.19 Most notably, courts' decisions to apply rational basis review
in most equal protection cases reflects an acknowledgement of
their inability to discern precisely when government action fails the
constitutional requirement that government classify only in pursuit
of the public interest. In such cases, sub-constitutional decisional
aids, such as estimations of a party's ability to influence the political
process, assist courts in reaching results that approximate the
constitutional rule.
Foreign law, by providing examples of other
legal systems' conclusions about similar issues, may well provide yet
another decisional aid assisting American courts attempting to
apply the American constitutional rule. Under this theory, foreign
law does not influence the actual meaning of the American
constitutional provision, but rather assists courts in their search for
the unique meaning of that provision.
Foreign law may play a more fundamental role in
constitutional adjudication. 2 1 If the given constitutional right can
be understood as incorporating a universal norm, then foreign law
could well play a role in informing the actual meaning of the
constitutional provision, rather than simply serving as a decisional
aid that occupies only sub-constitutional status. Lawrence stands as a
prime example of just such a possibility. Even more than in a case
such as Roper v. Simmons,2 2 which simply used foreign law as
"confirmatory" of the court's independent analysis of the Eighth
Amendment3 Justice Kennedy in Lawrence relied heavily on how
foreign courts and legislatures had treated sexual intimacy. 24 In
conjunction with this reliance on foreign law, Justice Kennedy
defined the right at issue in Lawrence as one involving "liberty,"
rather than the more standard doctrinal approach of asking
whether the interest at stake was a fundamental "privacy" interest.
19. See William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of
EqualProtection,79 TUL. L. REV. 519, 528-42 (2005).

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
See infra Part III.A-B.
125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
See id. at 1198.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-78 (2003).

25.

Id. at 564-65.
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This doctrinal shift matters for our purposes because it opens the
door to a much broader use of foreign law in defining the content
of substantive due process, given the global meaningfulness of
liberty, in contrast to the relatively more parochial significance of
privacy, as that term is understood in American constitutional
doctrine.
This Article examines these three issues about the borrowing
of foreign and international law to adjudicate claims under the
Constitution. First, it examines whether a meaningful distinction
can be drawn between structural provisions and individual-rights
provisions. 26 It has been argued that structural provisions are the
unique result of particular historical, political and social
conditions, and thus unamenable to interpretation based on
analogous provisions in foreign law. 2 7 By contrast, as suggested
above, individual-rights claims might be thought of as more
inherently universal. 28 The first part of the Article considers
can be distinguished in such a way.29
whether structural provisions
3
0
It suggests that they cannot.
The Article then moves on to consider individual rights
claims. 3 1 It considers the usefulness of foreign law as a decisional
aid to American courts attempting to approximate the rule
established in the Constitution. 32
Foreign law can provide
empirical evidence of the sort relevant to the application of the
constitutional rule. For example, it can provide evidence of the
weightiness of a state's interests in impairing a constitutional value
and the public need for such an impairment. It can also provide
part of the social context against which American courts make
decisions about the fairness of a given classification
or the respect
33
to be accorded particular private conduct.
The Article then examines whether foreign law can play more
34
than merely a supporting role in constitutional adjudication.
Moving from equal protection, which provides the examples for
much of the preceding analysis, the Article considers substantive

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See infra Parts II-III.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part 111.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Parts III.B.1-2.
See infra Parts III.B-C.
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due process, and in particular, Justice Kennedy's understanding of
substantive due process in Lawrence.35 It suggests that Justice
Kennedy's understanding of substantive due process may effectively
36
have globalized that provision into a general guarantee of liberty.
If this is true, then foreign law could become substantially more
relevant to constitutional adjudication than it has been in the past.
In particular, it could be highly relevant to gay rights claims in
areas ranging from marriage and parenthood discrimination to
military service.
The Article then considers the possible uses of international,
as opposed to foreign, law. 3 7 Following the basic analytical method
applied earlier to foreign law, it first considers whether treaty
norms ratified by the Senate can serve not simply as law themselves,
but as inputs into judicial analysis of domestic constitutional
provisions.38 Because the U.S. Senate has added non-self-executing
statements to its ratification of many human rights treaties, it may
be important to find such a use for such treaty norms in order for
39
treaty law to play a role in protecting Americans' human rights.
Under Lawrence's analysis of substantive due process, such norms
can in fact play a useful role in domestic constitutional doctrine, by
reflecting social and moral judgments about the value to be
accorded such conduct.
The Article then moves to non-controlling international law,
such as treaties to which the United States is not a party and
customary international law to which the United States has
objected persistently enough to gain an exemption.
In Roper v.
Simmons the Court arguably used both of these sorts of law to
"confirm" its conclusion that the Eighth Amendment prohibited
the execution of inmates who were juveniles when they committed
their crimes. 4 1 The Article examines the Court's analysis in Roper to
determine how Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in particular is
amenable to such legal sources.
It argues that Eighth
Amendment doctrine's focus on offender culpability and social
consensus render it amenable to foreign and international law
35.

See infra Parts III.C.1-2.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See infra Parts III.C.1-2.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part 1V.B.
See 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198-1200 (2005).

42.

See infra Part IV.B.
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conclusions regarding the appropriateness of particular types of
punishments for particular classes of offenders.
The Article then considers whether similar analysis would
apply to due process and equal protection claims. 4 3 It argues that
the foundation of these rights in social judgments and the
globalization of those judgments deriving from the rise of
transnational social institutions renders these claims equally
amenable to influence from international and transnational
sources. While the current state of those social judgments is not
uniformly favorable to gay rights claims, the increased favor with
which global society views those claims makes international law
borrowing more attractive to gay rights litigators, in addition to
more doctrinally justifiable.
Throughout, this Article attempts to fit foreign and
international law within the framework of domestic constitutional
doctrine, rather than simply overlaying it without any nuance.
With the Court more accepting of the idea of foreign and
international law borrowing, the need for such a nuanced,
contextualized approach to the question becomes correspondingly
more pressing.
II. ARE STRUCTURAL PROVISIONS UNIQUELY RESISTANT TO FOREIGN
BORROWING?

Structural provisions are marked by several characteristics.
Most notably, such provisions are not adopted because of any
intrinsic worth they possess. They are instrumental, at least in
liberal societies based on popular sovereignty and organized for the
benefit of citizens rather than the state itself.
This
characteristic
of structural
arrangements
has
indeterminate consequences for the appropriateness of borrowing
foreign law. On the one hand, because such arrangements are
justified not by their intrinsic worth but instead by their success in
accomplishing some other goal, the experience of other nations
would seem quite relevant in determining the appropriate
arrangements for American government. Justice Breyer's dissent in
Printz v. United States reflects this attitude.' In his opinion, Justice
Breyer examined other nations' federal structures in the course of
determining
whether
the
federal
government
could
43.
44.

See infra Part IV.D.
521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (BreyerJ., dissenting).
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45
constitutionally command state institutions to enforce federal law.
In Justice Breyer's view, the instrumental nature of federalism
counseled in favor of examining other nations' experiences to
determine whether particular arrangements promote or inhibit the
46
underlying goal the structural provision seeks to achieve.
Examining the structures of other federal nations, Justice Breyer
noted that many were able to maintain vibrant federal systems even
when the central government was able to issue mandates of the sort
at issue in that case.
The opposing view is reflected in Justice Scalia's majority
opinion in Printz. Justice Scalia dismissed Justice Breyer's
invocation of other nations' federal structures. 4 8 He observed that
the structure of American government was simply different than
that of other nations. 49 Thus, he concluded that while comparative
study might be highly relevant to constitution
drafting, it was
5
irrelevant to constitutional interpretation. 0
Justice Scalia's remark illustrates the argument that choices
about governmental structure are exactly that-choices-rather
than normatively transcendent principles or empirically testable
propositions for which recourse to foreign law might be
appropriate. In Justice Scalia's view, structural provisions are
arbitrary, in the sense that they reflect the drafters' decisions that
certain structures were best suited to achieving the goals they
sought to achieve. 5 1 Other nations' constitution-makers might well
make different choices. 52
While the choices of foreign
constitution-makers might be useful as examples of structures that
should be embraced- "constitution drafting" -they are irrelevant

45. See id.
46. See id. (examining foreign precedent to determine whether the
commandeering of state governments attempted by the challenged federal law was
the best balance of the need for a central government and the liberty promoted by
local control).
47. Id.
48. Id. at921 n.11.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 919-22.

52. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
dissenting) ("[M]any countries of the world get along
much weaker than ours-in fact, entirely dependent on
the legislature."); see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,

711 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
with an executive that is
the continued support of
828 (1997) (noting that

more expansive legislator standing rules might exist in other nations' systems,

even if they do not exist in the American system).
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to understanding the choices that the American Constitution's
drafters actually did embrace- "constitutional interpretation."
Thus, at first glance, structural provisions, in part because of
their instrumental nature, may well not be amenable to
interpretation by reference to other nations' structural law. At least
this would be the case if one believed that structural provisions had
actual determinate meaning, as opposed to merely standing for a
broad principle, such as the existence of a vibrant federal system,
which could be applied by reference to how other legal systems
deal with the same issue.5 3 But this first cut is insufficiently precise.
Why is an instrumental provision necessarily arbitrary, in the sense
of representing a willful choice rather than an adoption of a rule
based on reason or universal values? Professor Vicki Jackson,
discussing the uses of comparative federalism law, advances the
discussion by arguing that federalism arrangements are historically
contingent and (in a non-pejorative way) unprincipled, and thus
not amenable to illumination by reference to foreign judicial
analysis. 54
She writes that "federalism provisions are often
peculiarly the product of political compromise in historically
situated moments, generally designed as a practical rather than a
principled accommodation of competing interests," and thus are
"unique to the parties' situations." 5 She continues that federalism
arrangements are not only a compromise, but also a compromise
that "typically constitutes an interrelated
'package'
of
arrangements. '' 56 Thus, while the historically contingent nature of
those provisions makes their proper interpretation resistant to
foreign law borrowing, 57 this "package deal" aspect makes it
inappropriate to interpret those provisions as isolated principles.58
The contingent nature of structural provisions arguably
extends to the identity of the groups constituting the society to be
governed.
If structural arrangements can be understood as
agreements setting the rules of the road between the groups
constituting the society, then the unique combination of groups in
53. But see Printz, 521 U.S. at 976, 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing Printz as
posing the "common legal problem" of "reconciling central authority with the need to

preserve the liberty-enhancing autonomy of a smaller constituent governmental entity").
54. Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative
ConstitutionalExperience,51 DuKE L.J. 223, 247-50 (2001).
55. Id. at 273.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 273.
58.
See id. at 273-74.

2006]

FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN GAY RIGHTS

465

a given society necessarily means that different arrangements can
never truly be compared. Federalism provisions in the Indian
Constitution-designed largely to accommodate the nation's
ethnic and religious diversity-may be incomparable to those in
the German Basic Law, which were motivated not by such diversity
but instead by a desire to prevent the totalitarian centralizing of
power that accompanied Nazism. 59 In our own day, we are
witnessing the creation of a federal structure in Iraq, whose
provisions most assuredly respond to the unique relationships
between the ethnic and religious groups struggling for power in
that nation. None of these may be comparable to the provisions
of American federalism, with its own unique set of historical and
social circumstances.
In sum, this argument maintains that both the historical
contingency of these provisions and their interrelationship to other
parts of the overall compromise struck when establishing
constitutional structure tie their meaning closely to purely
domestic interpretive sources. Analogous foreign provisions are
fundamentally different, given that they resulted from different sets
of pressures and actors.
However, it is unclear why the characteristics described above
describe only structural provisions. For example, the history of the
Reconstruction Amendments suggests that "political compromises
in historically situated moments" greatly influenced whether the
broadly worded guarantees' of the Thirteenth or Fourteenth
Amendments would encompass the right to vote or "social," as
opposed to "civil," equality.
The Founders' compromise with
slavery also resulted from such a historically situated moment.
Moreover, the Founders' compromise constituted a key part of an
"interrelated 'package' of arrangements" that made possible a
national consensus in favor of ratifying the Constitution itself.62 As

59. See, e.g., Clifford Larsen, States Federal, Financial, Sovereign and Social: A
Critical Inquiry into an Alternative to American FinancialFederalism, 47 AM. J. COMP. L.

429, 460 (1995) (noting that the Allies' postwar concern with Nazi centralization
led them to impose a federal structure on Germany, creating states that for the
most part had no historical roots).
60. See IRAQI CONSTITUTION arts. 109-110 (dealing with allocation of power over
oil resources); art. 111 (dealing with clashes between local and national law); art. 114
(dealing with rights of provinces to form larger regions), available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/l1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/24-08-05-constit.pdf.
61. SeeJackson, supranote 54, at 273.
62. See id. at 273-74.
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a result of that compromise, however, language in rights provisions
such as the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause had to be
contorted-that is, read against the context of a uniquely American
history-in order to accommodate slavery-protective federal laws
such as the Fugitive Slave Acts, and the permissibility of slavery in
the District of Columbia. 63 These examples illustrate that rights
provisions, just like structural ones, may well be historically situated
compromises that 64make their cross-national comparisons
inappropriate as well.
Even more fundamentally, the very difference between
Rights
structural and rights provisions is hardly watertight.
provisions are not simply statements of individual rights as against
an abstract "government"; instead, they also function as protections
of minorities against majorities.65 Indeed, Akhil Amar has argued
that the Bill of Rights was in fact originally intended as structural

63. See generallyJACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965).
64. Of course, sometimes the historical context of a constitution-drafting
period is reflected in the actual text of a given provision. Thus, for example,
provisions of the German Basic Law explicitly condition grants of individual rights
on the continued security of the democratic system itself. See Donald P. Kommers,
German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY LJ. 837, 854-55 (1991). This
provision resulted from the experience the Basic Law's framers had with the rise
of Nazism and the Nazis' use of democratic freedoms to subvert that very system.
Judith Wise, Dissent and the Militant Democracy: The German Constitution and the
Banning of the Free German Workers Party, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE, 301, 302
(1998). But in such cases the inappropriateness of foreign borrowing is much
clearer, and less controversial, given the clear textual commitment to a certain
choice. By contrast, provisions such the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
are at least potentially open to borrowing, given their open-ended quality. E.g.,
Robert A. Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in ConstitutionalAdjudication: An Assessment
and a Different Perspective,44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 110 (1983) ("From Lochner to Roe...
the Court clearly has not seen its function in constitutional adjudication to be
limited to implementing the values constitutionalized by the framers. The Court
itself has infused values into the open-ended concepts of due process and equal
protection."). While the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses are openended and leave significant room for judicial interpretation, the Clauses and their
historical context provide no clear basis for using foreign law as an interpretation
aid. The question of whether borrowing is an appropriate interpretative tool
when construing these clauses therefore raises borrowing questions that are more
difficult to answer than in the context of, for example, the German Basic Law.
65. See, e.g.,
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 964-66 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (finding the legislative veto to be unconstitutional given the
procedural due process violations inherent in allowing a majoritarian legislature
to determine when an agency has correctly applied a regulation to an identified
individual); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (holding that requirement
that any city ordinance regulating on basis of race must be first approved by
majority was unconstitutional).
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protections for localism against the forces of a centralized
government. 66
Thus, rights provisions can be understood as
additions to government structure, by denying certain powers to
majorities, even if today we have67come to pigeonhole provisions as
"structural" or "rights granting."
For these reasons, any possible distinction between structural
and rights provisions cannot by itself serve as the basis for
determining the appropriateness of foreign law borrowing, even
assuming that these two types of provisions can coherently be
distinguished.
Fundamentally, both structural and rights
provisions
result from
particular
historical
and
social
circumstances; therefore, this characteristic does not support a
distinction on this issue. A more supple analysis is required, one
that examines the particular function which foreign law is being
offered up to play.
The next section of the Article considers the 6articular uses
foreign law can play in constitutional interpretation.
It uses rights
provisions as illustrations, in part because as a practical matter gay
rights advocates' constitutional rights claims rest largely (though
not completely) 69 on individual rights provisions, most notably due
process and equal protection.
In addition, though, rights
provisions are especially prone to claims that foreign law provides
insight into their meaning. Rights provisions are often written in
language, such as "equal protection" or "liberty" or "freedom of
speech," that has come to signify global norms. A search for the
meaning of such a provision thus naturally leads to the meaning of
those global norms.
In addition, courts' primary roles as protectors of rights render
them unable to shy away from construing vaguely worded, open-

66.

AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION chs. 1-6

(1998).
67.
See generally William D. Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: Equal Protection,
the Separation of Powers, and the Line Between Statutory Amendment and Statutory
Interpretation, 48 CATH. U. L. REv. 1055, 1092-1101 (1999) (discussing the
individual rights background of separation of powers issues).
68. See infraPart III.
69. Most notably, the law review literature has abounded with discussions
about whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause could be used to expand same-sex
marriage rights from individual states to the entire nation, and, conversely,
whether Congress appropriately used its power to enforce that clause when it
sought to prevent such an outcome by enacting the Defense of Marriage Act. See,
e.g.,
Phyllis G. Bossin, Same-Sex Unions: The New Civil Rights Struggle or an Assault on
TraditionalMarriage?,40 TULSA L. REV. 381, 386 (2005).
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ended rights provisions; by contrast, they might be more willing
(and indeed, feel obligated) to demur when confronting
interbranch or federal-state conflicts.7 0 The requirement that
courts adjudicate rights claims, even when they involve
indeterminate language and a contested drafting history, means
that they will often search for sub-constitutional rules or decisional
aids to assist them. Such rules and aids do not reflect actual
constitutional meaning, but instead constitute heuristics that help
the court approximate the actual constitutional rule when it
decides the case. Building on his previous work,7 1 the author
suggests that foreign law, even if not an appropriate tool in actually
defining the content of constitutional provisions, can play a very
useful role in providing aids that assist a court in determining for
itself the unique meaning of American constitutional provisions.
III. INTERPRETING RIGHTS PROVISIONS BASED ON FOREIGN LAW

The practice of borrowing from foreign (and, indeed,
international) 72 law when interpreting rights provisions requires a
theory of how such law properly influences the meaning of the
given provision.
This is different from the status of international
law as such as binding on American courts. 74 Of course, foreign law
may influence the development of a customary norm of
international law, which might then in its own right bind American
courts. But this is a different question from whether and how
foreign law itself should directly influence American law.

70.
See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-56
(1985) (concluding that federalism-based concerns about the imposition of
federal regulations on states are best addressed through the political process);
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998-99 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(using the political question doctrine to refuse to intervene in a struggle between
the President and members of the Senate over the Senate's role in abrogating
treaty obligations).
71.
See Araiza, supra note 19; William D. Araiza, Court, Congress, and Equal
Protection: Whiat Brown Teaches Us About the Section 5 Power, 47 HOWARD L. REV. 199
(2004).
72.
See infra Part IV.
73.
See generally Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional
Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639, 641 (2005).
74.
See, e.g., Anne Bayefsky &Joan Fitzpatrick, InternationalHuman Rights Law
in United States Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1992)
(discussing the acceptance of customary international law as binding in United
States courts); see also discussion infra Part IV.

2006]
A.

FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN GAY RIGHTS

469

ForeignLaw as a Source of ConstitutionalLaw

It is necessary to develop a theory of contemporary foreign
law's relevance to constitutional interpretation in order to answer
the contention that the particular rights provision at issue
represents only a grant of discrete, bounded rights defined by the
historical circumstances of the drafting and the intentions of the
drafters and ratifiers. 75 Of course, this contention goes beyond
questioning the practice of foreign law borrowing to challenge any
interpretive method that seeks to find meaning in a provision
beyond that clearly intended by its drafters. 7 6 It has been argued,
for example, that the concerns motivating the Thirty-Ninth
Congress require that the Equal Protection Clause be understood
simply as a mandate of racial equality (and indeed, racial equality
with regard only to a discrete set of rights), rather than as a general
expression
that all persons should in some way be treated
"equally. ' 7 7 Under a strict originalist methodology, it would be
inappropriate to consider not only contemporary foreign law
conceptions of what constitutes equal treatment, but even evolving
domestic 78
understandings of what classifications should be
disfavored.
Broader interpretive philosophies suggest different uses of
foreign law. For example, if one believes that a given constitutional
provision constitutionalizes a less specific, more evolving
conception of rights, as, for example, the Eighth Amendment is
currently understood, 79 then the question becomes one of
identifying the relevant community whose evolving opinions count.
That community could include foreigners, if, for example, the
provision at issue constitutionalizes a norm that is understood to be
75. Even an originalist interpretive theory might give effect to foreign law.
However, that foreign law would be the foreign law existing at the time of the
drafting, and then, of course, only if the judge was convinced that the drafters
looked to that foreign law when writing the provision in question. See Alford, infra
note 73, at 645-58 (discussing the role foreign law plays in originalist
interpretation).
76. This statement assumes that the drafters themselves intended, or at least
were not opposed to, an interpretive methodology that focused on their own
intent. This assumption is contested. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885 (1985) (concluding that the
framers would have opposed such a methodology).
77.
See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 171 (1977).

78.
79.

See, e.g., id.
See infra Part I.B.
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global, such as equality or freedom of conscience. If the meaning
of such a norm is developed through the legal process, then it
might be appropriate to say that that community would consist of
foreign lawyers and jurists, who develop such norms through8 their
work with analogous language within their own legal systems. '
Thus, unless the provision at issue can be thought of as having
a built-in reference to evolving foreign law, either in the necessary
implications of its text 82 or the clear intentions of the drafters, 83 the
relevance of such law can only be determined after resolving the
question of the proper interpretive methodology. Such a theory
might, for example, suggest that a court should seek to "translate"
the drafters' intentions into contemporary context. 84 Alternatively,
it might call for judges to focus on the bare text of the particular
provisions, or to current majoritarian understandings of what that
text should mean, 85 without reference to the meaning the drafters
intended to convey when using that text. Thus, it might call for
judges to construe the term "equal protection of the laws"
according to the court's best notion about what those words can
encompass and should normatively mean, rather than what the
80. See Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, InternationalLaw, and Constitutional Rights, 55
STAN. L. REv. 1999, 2021-25 (2003) (discussing how cases of human rights are
particularly likely to involve sets of universally held values).
81.
See, e.g., Ian Johnstone, Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better
Argument, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 437, 450 (2003) (discussing the concept and
composition of an interpretive community as including those that develop and

apply the legal norm at issue).
82. For example, the provision authorizing Congress to define and punish
crimes "against the Law of Nations" would seem to incorporate the evolution of
the law of nations. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Compare Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004), for a discussion of the Court's position that
takes only cautious steps in the judicial definition of offenses against the law of
nations, in part to avoid intruding on congressional prerogatives to decide issues
of foreign relations.
83. But cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727-28 (attempting to determine whether the
drafters of the Alien Tort Statute intended to embrace an evolving conception of
customary international law when authorizing federal courts to hear cases alleging
violations of the law of nations).
84. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1165
(1993) (arguing that constitutional notions will change over time as a matter of
fidelity, which means that they must change in order to stay in accord with the
Constitution's original meaning).
85. For example, the argument has been made that the people, acting
through Congress, should have significant discretion in determining the
appropriate meanings of the various guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See, e.g. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection By Law: Federal
AntidiscriminationLaw After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000).
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drafters intended to accomplish by writing them. Alternatively, one
might embrace a theory in which legislatures have the authority
to
86
interpret what equal protection of the laws means today.
Obviously, such theories are highly controversial.
The
underlying debates about these interpretive theories are at least as
contested as the question of foreign law's appropriate influence on
constitutional interpretation. Indeed, most commentators' and
judges' views on foreign-law borrowing probably flow from their
position onS these
87 larger issues of interpretive methodology, rather
than vice-versa.
This Article avoids such a grand inquiry into
methods of constitutional interpretation, which would overwhelm
its focus on the appropriateness of foreign-law borrowing. Instead,
it examines the possibilities88for more modest use of foreign law in
constitutional adjudication.
B. Foreign Law as an Input into ConstitutionalAnalysis
A more promising approach to foreign law's use in
constitutional interpretation distinguishes between the tasks of
finding constitutional meaning and applying that meaning to
decide particular cases. While it might be difficult to use foreign
law to influence the abstract meaning of American constitutional
provisions, it is far more defensible to use foreign law as a
decisional aid in applying that meaning to particular contexts. To
clarify this point, this part of the Article first explains the
distinction between constitutional law and sub-constitutional
decisional aids. 89 It then examines two ways in which foreign law
can assist in the application of constitutional law to a given set of
90
facts.
1.

Interpretingthe Constitution andDeciding Cases

A court's prime obligation in hearing a case is to rule for one
side or the other. While seemingly a truism, this observation
implies an important point-that a court's prime function is not to
86.

See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)

(suggesting that

Congress could determine for itself the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause).
87.

Alford, supra note 73, at 641 ("Comparativism is not a constitutional

theory; it is a methodology that is employed depending on a judge's particular
theory.").
88. See infra Part III.B.
89. See infra Part III.B.1.
90. See infra Parts III.B.1-2.
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interpret law. Of course, a court may have to interpret law in the
course of deciding which party should prevail, but in such a case
the task of law interpreting is subsidiary and instrumental, and
often unnecessary. For example, courts generally do not pass on
legal arguments unnecessary to the decision of the case. Only legal
conclusions necessary to the decision of the case are considered the
binding precedent created by that case, while all other legal
analysis is deemphasized as dicta. 9 1 Decisions that have no impact
on actual parties are beyond the scope of the federal judicial power
to decide "cases and controversies.
Thus, the legal force of a
court's actions on third parties-that is, its authoritative statement
of law-is inextricably
tied to the result of the dispute the court
93
adjudicated.
Thus, a court's prime responsibility is to decide the case in
front of it. While that responsibility sometimes requires the court
to interpret law, often a court will confess its inability truly to
determine what the Constitution requires. At times this inability
will lead a court simply to decline to decide a case. 94 However, this
option is usually not available when the question is one of
individual rights, given courts' special responsibility to vindicate
those rights.
In such situations courts must decide, despite their
inability to distill from the Constitution a rule precise enough to
govern particular cases.
As the author has argued elsewhere, rational basis review
under the Equal Protection Clause provides a clear example of
courts deciding cases without authoritatively interpreting the
91. To continue this point, when the majority of a multijudge panel agrees
on a result but disagrees on the rationale, the narrowest rationale taken by a
member of the majority becomes the holding. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.

188, 193 (1977) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
92.
See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (holding that a case
that is mooted is beyond the Court's Article IIIjudicial power).
93.
Similarly, in Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall defended the
practice ofjudicial review as incident to a court's need, as part of deciding a case,
to determine which law applied when two laws conflicted. 5 U.S. 137, 177-78

(1803).
94. See, e.g.,
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (citing as one of the
criteria for calling an issue a nonjusticiable political question the lack ofjudiciallymanageable standards for deciding the case).
95. See, e.g., Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163-166 (concluding that once a right has
vested in an individual it falls to the courts to provide a remedy for any violation of
that right); cf Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575-77 (1992) (holding
that generalized grievances are beyond the scope of the judicial power, given the
capacity of the public to vindicate its generalized rights in the political branches).
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S• 96

underlying legal principle.
Briefly, the argument is that
institutional competence concerns make it impossible for a court
truly to know what equal protection requires in many situations. As
a result, the courts often accord deferential scrutiny to challenged
classifications, relying on presumptions of constitutionality and
conclusions about the burdened party's ability to influence the
political
process
to
prevent
or
remedy
inappropriate
97
classifications.
The results of such "rational basis" scrutiny-that
the government almost always wins-should not be understood as
reflecting the true equal protection requirement. 9 8 Rather, those
results reflect courts doing their best to identify the constitutional
law applicable to a case through the use of presumptions,
estimations of political strength, and other sub-constitutional, but
judicially manageable, rules of thumb.
2. Foreign Law as an Input in DecidingCases: The Example of
Equal Protection
Foreign law can provide similar decisional aids in
constitutional cases. On this theory, traditional domestic sources of
the meaning of provisions such as equal protection or substantive
due process often don't provide precise answers to questions courts
must answer. Foreign law can assist in the process of applying such
vague constitutional rules, even if it does not play a role in
uncovering the abstract meaning of those rules.
An example may clarify this argument. Consider a claim that
that the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)'s definition 99 of
marriage to exclude same-sex unions violates the equality
component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Our
intuition might suggest that a court's evaluation of this claim would
be assisted by foreign courts' evaluations of similar claims made
under equality provisions of those other nations' constitutions. But
how?
Presumably the first doctrinal question would be whether the
Equal
Protection
Clause
even
addresses
the
relevant
discrimination-in this case, discrimination based on sexual
orientation or with regard to the ability to marry. Using foreign

96.
97.
98.
99.

See Araiza, supra note 19, at 535-38.
See id. at 538.
See id. at 537.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
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law-for example, the scope of other nations' contemporary
equality principles-to influence that decision suggests that
contemporary foreign law can help uncover actual constitutional
meaning.
Such a use implies an acceptance of particular
interpretive methodologies, and the rejection of others, most
notably one based on the intention of the drafters of the text.
After all, it is questionable whether foreign law equality norms (to
the extent they even existed in 1866) influenced the drafters, and
even more questionable whether the drafters directed their gaze
primarily at such foreign norms, rather than to the pressing
questions of slavery and racial equality that had ignited the Civil
War.
Of course, even if all that were true, an originalist
interpreting the Equal Protection
Clause would still refuse to resort
100
to contemporary foreign law.

The fact that using foreign law implies acceptance of one
interpretive theory and rejection of another does not make such
use illegitimate. As argued above, however, the fundamental
disagreement about interpretive methodologies cautions against
immediate embrace of a borrowing theory that presupposes a
choice on this more fundamental question. A more modest theory
allows courts to utilize foreign law in developing sub-constitutional
decisional rules to assist them in deciding constitutional cases.
Even more modestly, courts could use foreign law to illuminate the
context surrounding such sub-constitutional rules.
Equal protection provides a prime example of the role foreign
law can play. The historical context of the Equal Protection Clause
makes it clear that race classifications are almost never appropriate,
when their purpose or effect is to subordinate one race.101
at
In least
that sense, one might say that the rule against race classification,

100. See, e.g., Afford, supra note 73, at 645-59.
101. It becomes difficult at this point to discuss the role historical
understandings should play in understanding the Fifth Amendment's equality
guarantee. Most of the history generally thought to be relevant derives from the
Equal Protection Clause, ratified more than seventy years after the Fifth
Amendment. Because the Court has concluded that the Fifth Amendment's
equality guarantee is co-extensive with the Fourteenth Amendment's, (see Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)), and since a robust equality guarantee is generally
thought to have entered the Constitution via the Fourteenth Amendment, and
only then "reverse incorporated" into the Fifth Amendment (see generally
Richard A. Primus, Boiling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 975, 982-85 (2004) for a
discussion of the rise of reverse incorporation), it might make sense to focus on
the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, even when discussing the federal
government's equality obligations.
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10 2
or perhaps race subordination, is in fact constitutional "law."
However, other classifications-gender, sexual orientation, and
indeed every classification other than race-do not present
compelling historical arguments for their prohibition by the
drafters. Nevertheless, all of the Justices on the Court have agreed,
at least in principle, that a valid equal protection claim may be
made in the absence of a race-based classification. 103 As the author
has argued elsewhere, the equal protection principle is animated
by a second principle: a rule against arbitrary classifications devoid
of a genuine
public purpose either through utter irrationality 10 4 or
10 5
animus.
The rule against purely private-regarding classifications is
properly considered a rule of constitutional law: it does not derive
from any more fundamental principle found in equal protection,
but instead stands for the foundational proposition that in general
106
government may not classify simply for the sake of singling out.
As a rule of constitutional law, under the theory being sketched out
here foreign law should play no role in uncovering it.
However, foreign law can play a significant role in deciding
cases under that rule. Deciding whether a particular gender,
sexual orientation or other non-racial classification satisfies a public
purpose presents a difficult challenge to courts. In deciding such
issues, the Supreme Court has often relied on methodologies that
reach this question only indirectly, by asking whether the political

102. For purposes of this Article, it is irrelevant whether race classification in
general, or race subordination in particular, constitutes this core rule of equal
protection. Compare, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346 (2003) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring) (reserving this question), with City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the Equal
Protection Clause aims at race classification per se).
103. See, e.g., Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam).
In addition to Olech, of course, the Court has found a variety of non-racial
classification decisions to violate the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (sexual orientation); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (mental retardation); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S.
55 (1982) (status as recent arrival from out-of-state); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion) (gender).
104. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n of Webster County,
488 U.S. 336 (1989) (striking down a property tax valuation scheme as arbitrary
and thus in violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
105. See Araiza, supra note 19, at 551; see also Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at
448; Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (simple dislike of a group
an inappropriate ground on which to classify).
106. See generally Olech, 528 U.S. 562.
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situation facing the burdened group is such that arbitrary burdens
are likely to be caught by the political process. 107 When that
inquiry yields the result that a group is not a suspect class, the court
then applies a very deferential
••
• 108 ends-means scrutiny with a
presumption of constitutionality.
As the author has argued
elsewhere, such deferential review and such a presumption reflect
institutional competence concerns, rather than an assumption that
most of those109 classifications are likely constitutional in some
abstract sense.
a.

ForeignLaw as an EmpiricalInput

Foreign law can play a helpful role in mitigating that judicial
incompetence and allowing courts to play a more meaningful role
in evaluating constitutional gay rights claims. To the extent that
foreign law engages the questions of social reality that underlie
equal protection claims, it can provide useful inputs into an
analysis that is itself based on American constitutional doctrine.
Thus, to return to the DOMA example, foreign law could help an
American court decide empirical questions such as whether samesex households provide the same quality of childrearing as other
households, a factor that would surely go into a court's analysis of
DOMA's restrictions on gay marriage, should those restrictions be
defended with arguments that gays and lesbians do not provide
optimal child-rearing environments.1 10 To take another example,
foreign law could provide another source of expert opinion about
the compatibility between homosexuality and military service, and
thus provide input into an American court's evaluation of defenses
to the current "don't ask, don't tell" policy.
Note that the assistance foreign law provides here derives not
just from foreign judicial decisions but also from foreign law more
generally. Thus, a legislature's decision to allow gay marriage, an
administrative agency's decision to allow gays to adopt, or a military
command's decision to institute a non-discrimination rule should
count with American courts considering analogous issues in the
context of constitutional litigation. For example, Chief Justice
107. See Araiza, supranote 19, at 526-27.
108. See id. at 535-36.
109. See id. at 528-42.
110. See, e.g., Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *17-18
(Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (considering and rejecting claims that concern for
children's best interestjustifies prohibiting same-sex marriage).
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Rehnquist's opinion for the court in Washington v. Glucksberg relied
in part on a study undertaken by the Dutch government to
determine the effects of its assisted-suicide law.1 11 While Glucksberg
was a substantive due process case, the court used the Dutch study
to consider the empirical implications of assisted suicide, seeking
information about the plausibility of government concerns 112
in a way
relevant both to due process and equal protection analysis.
This use of foreign law might seem modest. It suggests that
foreign law constitutes nothing more than a respected source of
information, akin perhaps to a university research study. But law is
different. Because governmental actions carry with them great
consequences and are presumed to be the actions of that society
acting as a whole, governmental decisions of the sort described
above represent more than academic conclusions. Instead, they
reflect decisions by a polity, acting through its constituted
authority, to change the rules under which it exerts its sovereign
power. They are law-albeit foreign law-and thus deserve the
respect of other lawmakers, at least to the extent that the forei n
lawmakers' values are generally thought to be similar to our own.
Decisions by foreign governments that empirical facts support
particular outcomes deserve special respect from American courts,
since they reflect the wielding of the same sovereign power wielded
by American courts. 114
b.

ForeignLaw as Social Context

There remains the question whether foreign law can do more
than simply provide empirical support in applying domestically
derived legal rules. Again, equal protection provides a useful
context for this discussion. As argued above, the difficulty of
determining when classifications are truly based on publicregarding purposes renders much equal protection jurisprudence a
search for judicially manageable indicia of possible animus. 115 The
familiar tiered scrutiny structure, and more generally the degree of
skepticism with which a court will review a challenged classification,
111.

521 U.S. 702, 734 (1997).

112.

Id.

113.

For a discussion of which nations' laws should be consulted, and on which

issues, see infra Part III.B.3.
114. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003)

decision by the British Parliament to decriminalize same-sex conduct).
115. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.

(citing the
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reflect the Supreme Court's search for such indicia.
Beyond serving as empirical support for the application of
such scrutiny, foreign law may be useful to American courts
considering the inherent suspectness of a given classification tool.
If the search for the appropriate scrutiny level is fundamentally a
search for situations where animus is likely then foreign law may
help by indicating the likelihood of animus. This inquiry-halfway
between the uncovering of the anti-animus rule itself and the
consideration of empirical evidence in the course of applying the
appropriate scrutiny level-involves both an inquiry into social facts
and morality.
Equal protection analysis cannot avoid moral inquiry. Even
John Hart Ely, who provided perhaps the most compelling
argument for a value-free, process-based understanding of equal
protection (and constitutional law more generally), had to concede
the need for value judgments in equal protection when he noted
that equal protection doctrine amounted to a search for situations
where minorities were ignored in the political process for reasons
that were in some sense "discreditable."' 116 Standard suspect class
doctrine makes this clear when it asks, in addition to questions
about historical oppression and current political powerlessness,
whether the classification is in some measure unfair or contrary to
the idea that one should not be burdened for reasons beyond one's
even
the
political
control. 117
Indeed,
powerlessness criterion inevitably requires a normative baseline

116.

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OFJUDIcIAL REVIEW

152 (1980).
117. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality
opinion) (relying in part on the immutability of the gender characteristic in
concluding that gender classifications should be strictly scrutinized); Watkins v.
U.S. Army, 837 F.2d 1438, 1444 (9th Cir. 1988) (summarizing suspect class
doctrine as including a generalized concern that classifications not reflect "gross
unfairness that is sufficiently inconsistent with the ideals of equal protection to
term it invidious"), affd on different grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en
banc). Even this description does not fully explain standard equal protection
doctrine. As Ely concedes, being short or blind or having a low I.Q. is beyond
one's control, yet height, vision, and intelligence classifications generally raise no
equal protection problems, largely because we do not view the reasons for such
classifications as "discreditable." See ELY, supra note 116, at 152. This moral
understanding may well be evolving, as evidenced by passage of statutes such as
the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-02, 12111-17, 12131-34,
12141-50, 12161-65, 12181-89, 12201-13 (2000). This evolution, however, simply
underscores the fact that determinations about the appropriateness of
classifications are inherently based on moral judgments.
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since most minorities are politically powerless to some degree and
11 8
suffer from at least some lack of attention from decision makers.
The normative character of standard equal protection analysis
thus requires courts considering equality claims to engage both
with social reality and with society's understandings of what type of
discrimination is "arbitrary" or "unfair." Foreign law can play a role
here to the extent that American society's moral understandings
are reflected in and influenced by foreign law. The Supreme
Court's Eighth Amendment and substantive due process cases have
already recognized that foreign law both illuminates and influences
domestic moral understandings, l1 9 and at least two justices have
recognized how international law does the same in the equal
protection context. 12 Thus, foreign law can influence American
equal protection jurisprudence
by influencing American
perceptions of a classification's arbitrariness, and the moral
justifiability for a group's political powerlessness.
In this way, foreign law does not supply the foundational
components of American law. Nor, at the other extreme, does it
merely supply empirical support for its conclusions. Instead, under
this theory foreign law becomes part of the social context that
informs an American court's own moral judgments relevant to the
constitutional issue. In this sense foreign law is not qualitatively
different from other symbolic statements made in the public
square. Thus, in the gay rights context, foreign legal statements
play similar roles to corporations' grants of domestic partner
benefits, popular culture's positive portrayal of gays and lesbians,
or a prominent athlete's or soldier's coming out. All of these
statements become part of the background of shared-or at least
widespread-understandings against which courts must make
moral judgments when deciding a case.121
118.

See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REv. 713,

715 (1985).

119. See infra Part III.B. (discussing how foreign law relating to criminal
punishment illuminates the moral judgments relevant to Eighth Amendment
issues); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 ("The right the petitioners seek in this case has
been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries.").
120. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring, joined by Breyer, J.) (noting how a proper understanding of the
moral meaning of race-based affirmative action can be informed by international

law).
121.
See Jay Michaelson, Essay, On Listening to the Kulturkampf Or, How America
Overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, Even Though Romer v. Evans Didn't, 49 DUKE L.J.

1559, 1567 (2000) (explaining how the evolution of American society undermined
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Under this theory, it is not foreign law's uniquely legal status
that plays this influential role in American law. Instead, it is foreign
law's status as the output of institutions-foreign courts-that are
respected participants in the public debate about the morality of a
given government action. Still, foreign judicial pronouncements
may well be especially persuasive to American courts, since foreign
courts are largely answering the same type of question in the same
122
general institutional context as their American counterparts.
Thus, the reasoned nature of foreign judicial pronouncements,
their grounding in a fundamental legal mandate, and courts'
awareness that they are establishing limits on government actionthose
rather than mandates for private action-make
pronouncements especially significant to an American court
seeking123to understand the social context of an issue it must
decide.

3.

ForeignLaw as Law

Is there, however, a theory under which foreign law's uniquely
legal qualities influence American equality law? Is there something
about the theory of a foreign nation's law or the legal reasoning of
foreign courts that can directly translate into American law? In the
case of equal protection, foreign law clearly could inform the
application of that guarantee, either at the second step of
determining which classifications run a high risk of being arbitrary
or the third step of actually applying the appropriate level of
scrutiny to a given classification. However, for foreign law to
influence the first, foundational step of determining what the
Equal Protection Clause (or any other constitutional rights
guarantee) actually prohibits, one would have to derive a theory of
that guarantee in which its meaning has largely melded with the
meaning of other nations' analogous provisions.
The example of the Equal Protection Clause illustrates the
hurdles such a theory would face. A melding of that provision with
equality provisions in foreign constitutions would require that
the moral assumptions on which Bowers v. Hardwick was based).
122. See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994-96 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("[T]his court has long considered as
relevant and informative the way in which foreign courts have applied standards
roughly comparable to our own constitutional standards in roughly comparable
circumstances.").
123.
See infra Parts III.B-C.
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those foreign provisions have developed in parallel fashion to the
largely idiosyncratic evolution of American equal protection. In
particular, foreign equality law would have to place special
emphasis on racial equality, with other equality claims relegated to
a more amorphous concern with arbitrariness and animus.
Such
parallel development is not out of the question: racial
discrimination has been at the forefront of many nations' evolving
equality jurisprudence, and racial classifications have also earned
the special opprobrium of international law. On the other hand,
different nations' unique cultures and histories may lead their
equality law to focus just as fundamentally on religious, class, or
caste discrimination,
in stark contrast to American
• •sometimes
.
125
constitutional jurisprudence.
If one interprets the Equal
Protection Clause as fundamentally evincing a dual concern for
racial
discrimination
and
more
generally
for arbitrary
discrimination of any type, then it might be difficult to justify
foreign borrowing at this core level, given the uniqueness of this
combination.
Conversely, one could read the Equal Protection Clause as
fundamentally vacuous, in the sense that equality itself is a concept
that has no concept aside from moral determinations about which
groups deserve to be treated the same. Again, in such a case
foreign law qua law has no relevance to American constitutional
interpretation; indeed, in such a case there is no such thing as true
equal protection law. To be sure, foreign law could be useful in
adjudicating equal protection claims, but only by providing
empirical inputs or social context, as described in the previous
subsection.
However, other readings of equal protection might
be more hospitable to a more fundamental use of foreign law. One
interpretive theory would read the texts of constitutional
guarantees such as equal protection as too vacuous to provide
doctrine precise enough to govern the outcome of actual cases.127

124. See Araiza, supra note 19, at 522 (examining scrutiny levels applied to
equal protection claims based on gender and race).
125.
See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748 (2005) (Scalia,

J., dissenting)

(suggesting fundamental differences between American

and

European understandings of what government can do with regard to expressing

religious opinion); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1971) (concluding that
discrimination based on wealth receives only rational basis scrutiny).
126. See supra Part III.B.2.
127. See Araiza, supra note 19, at 522-23 (examining the Supreme Court's
methodology for evaluating equal protection claims). See generally DOuGLAS RAE,
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Moreover, the distance between the precise intent of the drafters
and the underlying principles of their handiwork may have grown
too large to justify relying on such precise intent. 128 In those cases,
an interpretive theory may call for finding meaning in the Clause's
surrounding context, examining the values that have been
constitutionalized there, and construing the provision at issue in
light of that context. It has been argued, for example, that in
interpreting state constitutional provisions that mimic federal
provisions, state courts should not ground a differing
interpretation of the state provision on some fictional cultural
distinction of the state's people, but instead on whatever
distinctions might appear through examination of the other
12 9
constitutional commitments made by the people of that state.
Under this theory, then, the meaning of the provision at issue can
be found, at least in part, by reference to the
130 values otherwise
enshrined as foundational by the state's people.
This interpretive method could apply to the question of

EQUALITIES (1989).

128. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2888 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
It is our duty, therefore, to interpret the First Amendment's command
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion"
not by merely asking what those words meant to observers at the time of
the founding, but instead by deriving from the Clause's text and history
the broad principles that remain valid today. As we have said in the
context of statutory interpretation, legislation "often [goes] beyond the
principal evil [at which the statute was aimed] to cover reasonably
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather
than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed."
In similar fashion, we have construed the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit segregated schools, even though
those who drafted that Amendment evidently thought that separate was
not unequal.
We have held that the same Amendment prohibits
discrimination against individuals on account of their gender, despite the
fact that the contemporaries of the Amendment "doubt[ed] very much
whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination
against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be
held to come within the purview of this provision," Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). And we have construed "evolving standards of
decency" to make impermissible practices that were not considered
"cruel and unusual" at the founding.
Id. (footnote and some citations omitted).
129. See Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretationin State ConstitutionalLaw,
84 VA. L. REv. 389 (1998) (examining state constitutionalism in light of
constitutional history rather than social history).
130. Id.
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borrowing from foreign law. Under this theory, courts would
consider whether a foreign nation's equality law is surrounded by a
context of other law that makes it defensible to find in that nation's
equality law an analogue to what is found in the Equal Protection
Clause. To the extent that other nations have enshrined in their
basic documents commitments similar to those found in the U.S.
Constitution, it might be appropriate to consider those nations'
equality guarantees as analogous to that in the Equal Protection
Clause, and thus interpretations of those foreign law guarantees as
instructive in interpreting our own. By contrast, those nations
whose basic commitments differ from our own would provide poor
models for borrowing.
131
Under this theory of "whole constitution interpretation,
a
nation that guarantees equality but nevertheless has an established
religion, or a religion qualification test for office-holding, would
not be a good candidate as a source of meaning for the Equal
Protection Clause, given the linkage American doctrine has drawn
between the non-establishment principle and equality of
citizenship. 132
Similarly, a nation whose constitution grants
individuals affirmative rights against the government, such as rights
to a basic level of material well-being, might also be a problematic
borrowing source, at least for equal protection claims that are
based on the government's failure to provide the material
resources necessary to exercise a right on the same terms as
wealthier Americans. 133
This theory goes some way toward answering a troubling
question pertaining to foreign borrowing, regardless of the
doctrine at issue: from which nations should we borrow?
Commentators have objected, for example, to the Supreme Court's
recent use of foreign law, describing it as selective. 134 The theory
131. This theory echoes, if distantly, Akhil Amar's theory of intratextualism, in
which he argues that constitutional language should be understood in relation to
how the same, or similar, language is used elsewhere in the document. See Akhil
Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747 (1999).
132. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000)
(expressing, as a core concern of the Establishment Clause, the principle that an
individual's religious views should not mark him as either an insider or an outsider
in the political community).
133.
Compare, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (finding no
constitutional right to government funding for abortions), with Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that a party's inability to pay did not
justify a State from denying access to courts to obtain a divorce).
134.
See, e.g.,Lawrence Connell, The Supreme Court, Foreign Law, and
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sketched above answers the more general question about from
whom to borrow, by answering that American courts should borrow
from those nations whose constitutional commitments in general
situate their relevant guarantee (e.g., equality) in roughly the same
doctrinal place as does the American provision at issue (e.g., the
Equal Protection Clause).
While this theory begins to answer the question of from whom
we should borrow, it still raises difficult questions for courts. In
particular, under this theory courts would have to employ a case-bycase or doctrine-by-doctrine approach when determining the
appropriateness of borrowing from a given nation's constitutional
law.
For example, an American court considering a sexual
orientation equality claim might appropriately borrow from a
foreign nation's equality jurisprudence when that foreign nation's
constitutional context includes an effective anti-Establishment
principle, so that religious disapproval of homosexuality carries the
same low constitutional weight it seems to in the United States after
Lawrence.135 On the other hand, a court considering a claim that

Constitutional Governance, 11 WIDENER L. REv. 59, 74 (2004) (discussing Justice
Stevens' use of foreign law in Atkins); see also Edward Lee, The New Canon: Using or
Misusing Foreign Law to Decide Domestic IntellectualProperty Claims, 46 HARv. INT'L L.J.
1, 24 (2005) (examining "cherry-picking" of foreign law). Of course, in Lawrence
itself, Justice Kennedy used foreign law not so simply to derive the meaning of the
Due Process Clause, but also to refute the argument made by Chief Justice
Burger's concurrence in Bowers that western civilization had consistently
condemned same-sex intimacy.
135. Note, of course, that even this seemingly simple statement immediately
becomes complicated by the need to determine the reality of the foreign nation's
law. For example, the United Kingdom, from which Justice Kennedy drew much
of his foreign law support in Lawrence, has a head of state that is simultaneously
and ex officio the head of a church. What this caveat suggests, then, is that the
determination which foreign legal systems are relevantly like our own requires
careful consideration looking beyond surface characteristics such as the United
Kingdom's official religious establishment.
See, e.g., Peter Cumper, Religious
Human Rights in the United Kingdom, 10 EMoRYJ. INT'L L. 115 (2000) (describing
scope of religious liberty in the United Kingdom); A. Krishnaswami, Study of
Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices, at 47, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1 (1960) (describing the establishment of religion in the
United Kingdom as "not much more than a mere historic relic"), quoted in Nathan
Adams, A Human Rights Imperative: Extending Religious Liberty Beyond the Border, 33
CORNELL
INT'L
LJ.
1,
25
n.176
(2000);
Jonathan
Sacks,
Antidisestablishmentarianism-A Great Word and a Good Ideal, TIMES (London), July
20, 2002, at 44 ("(Imagine) entering a crowded room, knowing no one, and then
discovering to your relief that there is a host who greets you, introduces you to
others, and makes you feel at home. In a multifaith England, the Church of
England is that host."), quoted in Paul Salamanca, The LiberalPolity and Illiberalismin
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denial of state funding for abortions violates the Equal Protection
Clause might find it less defensible to borrow from that same
foreign nation's equality jurisprudence if that foreign nation
situates its equality guarantee within a context of a constitutional
commitment that government provide basic material goods. In the
gay rights hypothetical, the foreign nation's equality law can be
understood as similar to that of American law, and thus legitimate
persuasive authority, because the surrounding context of the
equality guarantee is similar. But in the abortion funding example,
the fundamentally different understandings of what the
government is constitutionally obligated to provide necessarily
make the seemingly similar equality provisions not equivalent.
Thus, the requirement that a court consider not just the
parallelism between U.S. and a given nation's foreign constitutional
structure in general, but with regard to how that foreign law would
approach a particular claim, requires that courts determine the
appropriateness of borrowing at a fairly specific level of generality.
In short, it requires the domestic court to consider carefully what
exactly that foreign law is by examining its context. 136
C. Substantive Rights Claims and ForeignLaw
Foreign law borrowing in cases involving substantive rights can
be appropriately analyzed under the theories sketched out above.
However, substantive claims also raise unique issues that warrant
separate discussion. In one sense, substantive rights are less
amenable to foreign borrowing because the constitutional
provisions bestowing those rights may have more determinate
meanings based on judicially cognizable sources.
This
characteristic distinguishes them from equality rights, given the
legally vacuous (if socially rich) concept of equality. For example, a
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures might be
comprehensible based on the framers' understanding of what
constitutes a search, or a guarantee of free speech might be
properly analyzed against the content-neutrality rule, which itself
derives from an understanding of what is required
by the
• -137
Constitution's assumption of popular sovereignty.
Because

Religious Traditions,4 BARRY L. REv. 97, 100 (2003).
136. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
137. See Araiza, supra note 19, at 529. For the classic statement of the selfgovernment rationale for speech protection, see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
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courts can interpret these provisions by recourse to standard,
domestic legal sources, one might argue that those sources should
be the primary interpretive guides. 138The assumption, of course, is
that such standard legal sources exist and in fact refer back to
domestic sources of meaning.
1. ForeignLaw as a Source of Due ProcessDoctrine
The development of American constitutional law makes
application of this basic idea somewhat more difficult with regard
to rights that are unenumerated, or explicit but still open-ended.
The Slaughter-House cases gutted the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the provision the drafters
probably intended to serve as the primary source of individuals'
substantive rights against states. 139 This development forced the
Court in later years to turn to the Due Process Clause as a source of
substantive rights.
As has often been pointed out, the
substitution of the Due Process Clause for the Privileges and
Immunities Clause as the source of substantive rights has rendered
the entire field of substantive constitutional rights far more
uncertain, given the relatively more determinate nature of the term
"privileges and immunities," and the inherently amorphous nature
of the concept of substantive due process.141
The shift to due process has largely decoupled the main
substantive rights provision in the U.S. Constitution from text and
common law precedent. In turn, this move may make it more
appropriate to borrow foreign law. In the case of substantive due
process, foreign law could be appropriately used not just as a
practical decisional input, as described above, but also as a source
of meaning for the right itself. Despite the best attempts of Justice
Scalia and those of similar mind, the Supreme Court has never
repudiated the project of finding substantive rights in the Due
Process Clause. Indeed it has continued to move, albeit cautiously,
toward expanding the scope of rights it protects. Moreover, the
Court has failed to unite behind a due process methodology based
solely on history and tradition. 142 Thus, the court's continued
357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis,J., concurring).
138.
SeeAraiza, supra note 19, at 530.
139. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 44 (1872).
140. See Araiza, supranote 19, at 528-35.
141.
See id. at 557.
142.
See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 136-37 (1989) (Brennan,
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search for new due process rights remains only partially tethered to
domestic historical and legal traditions, and thus, at least
potentially open to a broader set of decisional inputs.
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence hints at the broader
scope foreign law can play in the due process inquiry. Notably, his
discussion of substantive due process deemphasizes inquiry into the
historical pedigree of the right at issue.14 3 Instead, Justice
Kennedy's inquiry began in earnest with a relatively modern case,
Griswold v. Connecticut, and its progeny. 4 4 Lawrence provides very
little discussion of whether the right at issue-however framedwas affirmatively protected or valued by earlier American law and
society. 145 Rather, when Justice Kennedy did address the history of
affirmative legal protection for sexual intimacy, he looked at more
recent legal developments, which he described as "show[ing] an
emergingawareness
that liberty gives substantial protection" to same46
sex intimacy. 1
It is in this part of the opinion that Justice Kennedy used
foreign law. In particular, he pointed not just to recent legal
evolution in the United States, but also statutory and judicial
developments in the United Kingdom and the European
Community. 147 On one reading, Justice Kennedy's citation of
foreign law reflects nothing more than a refutation of Chief Justice
Burger's concurrence in Bowers, which relied on a supposed
Western consensus disapproving of same-sex intimacy. 4 8 That
concurrence, by relying on such an asserted consensus, invited
14 9
refutation by citation of contrary western European authority.
However, the placement of this argument suggests that Justice
Kennedy intended to use foreign law to accomplish more than
simply refuting the Burger concurrence. Rather, he used foreign
law in his affirmative case, as evidence of "an emerging
J., dissenting) (noting the lack of agreement on the proper methodology for
analyzing substantive due process issues); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 512
U.S. 702, 752 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (adopting Justice
Harlan's view that due process asks whether the state has enacted an arbitrary
imposition or purposeless restraint); id. at 789-90 (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment) (also adoptingJustice Harlan's due process view).
143. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-73 (2003).
144. Id. at 566.
145. See generally id.

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
Id. at 569, 573.
Id. at 572-73.
See generally id. at 562-79.
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of the meaning of same-sex intimacy in the same
awareness
foreign societies whose legal principles Chief Justice 15 Burger
1
thought he had discerned, to the opposite effect, in Bowers.
Read in this latter sense, Justice Kennedy's citation of foreign
precedent suggests that foreign law can inform the fundamental
meaning of due process, by identifying same-sex intimacy as one of
In this way, foreign law
the rights due process protects.
constitutes far more than a mere empirical input into a calculus
defined solely by domestic law. Rather, it informs the Court's
understanding of what comprises the basic human freedom
protected by the Due Process Clause. Indeed, to the extent it
derives from nations whose values we share, 153 that foreign law can
seem as informing the core meaning of the Due Process Clause, via
the "whole constitution interpretation" method described earlier.
As such, Justice Kennedy's analysis raises the possibility of an
aggressive use of foreign law in constitutional adjudication.
2.

Due Process "Liberty" as an Entry Pointfor Foreign Law

Lawrence may have opened the door to consideration of
foreign law in defining the basic scope of constitutional protections
through a surprisingly direct, but potentially far-reaching, means:
its focus on liberty. As Randy Barnett has noted, Justice Kennedy's
analysis in Lawrence is striking for its focus on the guarantee of
"liberty" as opposed to "privacy." 154 This focus caused much of
Lawrence's muddying of standard due process doctrine. By focusing
on the textual right to liberty rather than on the unenumerated
right to privacy, Justice Kennedy's analysis arguably does away with
the need to determine whether the interest at stake in a given case
is a "fundamental privacy right" or a mere "liberty interest." 155 In
turn, it can pass over the question of what degree of scrutiny to
apply to the challenged government action. 56 Notably, Lawrence

150. Id. at 572.
Id. at 572-73.
151.
152. Id.
153.
See id. at 576-77.
154.
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's LibertarianRevolution: Lawrence
v. Texas, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 21, 21 (2003).
155.
Id. at 31.
156. But cf., e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53, 162-64 (1973) (identifying
abortion as part of the fundamental right to privacy, but acknowledging strong
state interests in the preservation of fetal life).

2006]

FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN GAY RIGHTS

489

157

ignored both of these questions.
Lawrence's focus on liberty could ultimately globalize due
process analysis.
By eschewing the standard due process
methodology of determining the fundamentality of the interest and
then applying the appropriate level of scrutiny, Justice Kennedy
does away with an analysis that looks more closely at American
society than at global standards. While the standard inquiry into
whether an interest is fundamental looks in large part to American
traditions, 158 the closest Justice Kennedy comes to explicitly
acknowledging the importance of the right at issue is his statement
that same-sex intimacy "has been accepted as an integral part of
human freedom in many other countries."1 59 It becomes even
clearer that this statement is the fulcrum of the argument when he
then immediately concludes that Texas had not shown any "more
legitimate or urgent" interest in circumscribing
that personal
•
•
160
Those tvo
choice than had been revealed in the foreign cases.
sentences are the heart of whatever individual right/state interest
balancing Lawrence performs. Indeed, when Justice Kennedy
quotes from Justice Stevens's dissent in Bowers and elevates those
quotations into the rule controlling the result in Lawrence, he
returns to the combination of liberty and the insufficiency of a state
interest in promoting a particular morality. 16 1 Once again, Justice
Kennedy provides no analysis of the weight of the individual's
interest, beyond saying that it is part of the liberty
that has been
62
acknowledged by foreign courts and legislatures.
By focusing on liberty, Justice Kennedy may have freed due
process analysis from the requirement of examining only American
157.

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out these

omissions).
158.

See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality

opinion) (stating that the crucial substantive due process question is whether the
interest at stake is solidly grounded in American history and tradition, and

concluding that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in American history and
tradition.).
159.
160.

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
Id.

161.
162.

Seeid. at 577-78.
Indeed, the only other place in the opinion where Justice Kennedy argues

affirmatively, rather than simply criticizing Bowers, is a vague, conclusory statement
that "[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for [the
purposes of personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education], just as heterosexual persons
do." Id. at 574.

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:2

law. As noted earlier, Lawrence's only real description of the legal
importance of same-sex intimacy identifies it as a part of human
freedom. 16 3 That description is nowhere near as parochial as the
descriptions standard due process doctrine uses to determine
whether an interest is fundamental: "a principle ofjustice so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental,"' 164 a principle "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition,"' 16 5 or "an enduring American tradition."' 166 Indeed,
the standard doctrine's very idea of a deeply rooted traditionnecessary perhaps in order to justify protection of an
unenumerated privacy right-suggests more of a domestic focus:
when we think of deep roots, we necessarily think of our roots, our
history, and our tradition. 6 7 The semantic and conceptual distance
between Lawrence and what came before it is confirmed by the fact
that Lawrence actually relied heavily on foreign law when
determining the constitutional status of the claimed right.
Lawrence can be read more narrowly, however. It may be that
Justice Kennedy concluded simply that the State's morality-based
argument failed to overcome the force of the liberty at stake, given
the illegitimacy of such a state interest. Lawrence's language also
supports this more limited reading. As noted earlier, Justice

163.
Id. at 577.
164. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (internal quotation
omitted).
165. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
166. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972). Of course, other criteria
for the fundamentality of due process rights are more cosmopolitan.
Most
notably, a strand of cases-perhaps best understood as dealing with questions of
fair judicial process-has looked at Anglo-American legal traditions. See, e.g.,
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968) (considering whether Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial applies to states via Due Process Clause). Other
cases have spoken more generally (and perhaps less precisely) of rights
fundamental to "civilization."
See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232; Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). Still, it is worth
wondering whether a tradition not strongly established in the United States would
nevertheless be found to be fundamental, based on some supposed general
acceptance either in those nations whose legal systems are based on English
common law, or in some wider civilization. If nothing else, Lawrence may signal a
more cosmopolitan approach in actual practice from these earlier cases, given its
heavy reliance on foreign law. See supranotes 150-160 and accompanying text.
167.
Indeed, even Justice Brennan's more rights-protective approach to
substantive due process did not exclude consideration of American history. See,
e.g.,
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 137 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the plurality's "exclusively historical analysis" as an "unfortunate
departure... from sound constitutional decisionmaking").
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Kennedy closed his attack on Hardwick by describing the right at
issue as "an integral part of human freedom in many other
countries" and then immediately concluding that Texas had shown
no more "urgent or legitimate" interest in circumscribing that
liberty than had governments in the foreign cases. 168 One way to
read this ambiguous language is that the Court's focus on liberty
applies only in the rare situation where the government's action is
supported by no legitimate interest. Indeed, such a reading would
fit within more standard due process law, which recognizes many
interests under the "liberty" heading, but also usually gives
government much deference when determining whether
infringements on liberty are appropriate, but which always requires
at least a legitimate justification for that infringement, even if the
169
court has to hypothesize it.
or
Thus, Lawrence may embrace "a presumption of liberty,"
its analysis may simply have flowed from the uniquely weak
argument made by the State. Regardless, the point remains that
shifting the analytical focus to liberty frees the court from the need
to rely on tradition, and thus, on American tradition, and thereby
allows consideration of non-domestic interpretive sources. In turn,
such a focus on a generic, global liberty may ultimately provide a
portal through which American courts can receive foreign law
understandings of basic substantive rights.
After Lawrence's
171th
rejection of morality-based arguments for suppressing liberty,
the
size and significance of such a portal may well turn on whether the
State can articulate a utilitarian basis for the challenged law.172 For
this reason, this portal for reception of foreign law may turn out to
be especially significant for gay rights claims, since impairments of
gay rights so often seem to be based more on moral disapproval or

168.
See supranote 159 and accompanying text.
169.
See, e.g.,
Bd. of Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972)
(including among rights protected by procedural due process the right to
contract); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)
(recognizing a presumption that facts exist necessary to justify government
regulation of commercial transactions).
170. See generally Barnett, supra note 154.
171.
See539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003).
172. This development also synchronizes substantive due process law with
equal protection law, which already largely disapproves of morality-based
justifications for unequal treatment. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (stating that a "bare ... desire to harm" an unpopular group
is insufficientjustification for unequal treatment).
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dislike than any true public purpose.173
IV.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Gay rights litigants can also deploy international law
principles, to the extent that such principles actually support gay
rights claims. Unlike foreign law, international law binding the
United States is enforceable in American courts. 174 Still, claims
based on international law raise difficult questions for American
courts. The status of treaties as binding law turns on whether the
treaty is considered self-executing, a complex inquiry that turns on
a variety of factors. 175 For its part, the unique character of
customary international law makes it difficult both to determine its
status relative to treaties or
domestic statutes 176 and indeed, even to
17 7
discern its very existence.
In the case of individual rights claims, part of the reason for
the unsettled place of international law is the existence of similar
domestic constitutional principles in the Bill of Rights and
Fourteenth Amendment. Together these provisions encompass
many of, though not all, the subjects addressed by international
human rights norms. 178 Undoubtedly, the longevity and (to some

173.
See William D. Araiza, ENDA Before it Starts: Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Availability of Damages Awards to Gay State Employees Under the
Proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act," 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 29-36
(2002) (discussing whether a large amount of anti-gay discrimination would fail
the rational basis test).
174. The classic statement of the status of international law in American courts
was delivered by the Supreme Court in Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900):
"International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." Id. As Louis
Henkin observes, this statement by Justice Gray "was neither new nor controversial
when made in 1900, since he was merely restarting what had been established
principle for the fathers of American jurisprudence and for their British legal
ancestors." See Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in the United States, 82 MICH.
L. REv. 1555, 1555 (1984).
175. See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The FourDoctrines of Self-Executing Treaties,
89 AM.J. INT'L L. 695, 695 (1995).
176. See Henkin, supra note 174, at 1561-67.
177. See, e.g., MARK W. JANIs, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (3d
ed. 1999) ("The determination of customary international law is more an art than
a scientific method.").
178. In particular, these provisions do not encompass positive rights, such as
those to employment or other material security, that have been the subject of
international human rights agreements. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 23, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc
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Americans) the apparent comprehensiveness of American
constitutional jurisprudence, when combined with the lack of
parallel foreign constitutional jurisprudential traditions, have made
American courts and lawmakers prone to assuming that
international human rights jurisprudence adds nothing to the
American tradition. 179 To that extent, international human rights

law might be viewed as superfluous, with no reason for litigants or
courts to place independent reliance on it. 180 Alternatively, to the
extent international norms provide more protection than the
Constitution, the United States has often either included a
reservation in its treaty ratification 18 1 or declared the treaty nonself-executing, 182 or, in the case of customary law, objected
persistently enough to raise questions about whether83the United
States has gained exemption from the customary rule.1
This Article skirts the difficult, if important, question of how,
in the abstract, particular international law principles qua
international law apply in American courts. 184 Instead, it focuses
on how international law can influence the development of
domestic constitutional doctrine. This choice reflects American
courts' willingness to use international law as an aid in interpreting
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (right to work).
179.
See, e.g., United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi,
J., concurring) (noting the history of American uniqueness in constitutional
adjudication); S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLIrICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 23, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 19, reprinted in 138 CONG. REc. S8068 (daily ed., Apr. 2, 1992) (stating the
view of the Senate Committee that existing U.S. law generally complies with the
Covenant).
180. Such a view might even lead the Senate either to fail to enact
implementing legislation, or even to declare that a treaty is not self-executing. See
Laurence R. Helfer & Alice M. Miller, Sexual Orientationand Human Rights: Toward
a United States and TransnationalJurisprudence,
9 HARV. HUM. RTS.J. 61, 78-80 (1996)
(recounting how the Senate used this justification to declare the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights non-self-executing).
181.
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1194 (2005) (noting U.S.
reservation to the provision of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights prohibiting juvenile executions).
182.
See David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-SelfExecuting Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 131-32
(1999) (noting history of non-self-executing declarations appended to Senate
ratifications of human rights treaties).
183.
See, e.g., Laurin B. Kallins, Note, The Juvenile Death Penalty: Is the United
States in Contravention of InternationalLaw?, 17 MD.J. INT'L L. & TRADE 77, 98-101
(1993) (examining the conduct of the United States in relation to international
law norms dealing with the juvenile death penalty).
184.
For an introduction to this topic, see Henkin, supra note 174.
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domestic
legal provisions, a willingness shown as recently as last
185
year.
When that willingness is combined with new domestic
doctrine more hospitable to gay rights claims and international
law's increased recognition of gay rights, it becomes clear that this
seemingly more modest use of international law offers real
opportunities to gay rights advocates. This part of the Article
considers these opportunities. It begins by examining the issues
surrounding the role of treaties and non-textual international law
in domestic legal interpretation. It concludes by briefly examining
the substance of those international law norms that may be useful
to gay rights litigators.
A.

Treaty-Based Law and ConstitutionalAnalysis

Justice Kennedy's focus on more modern developments as the
relevant tradition for due process purposes, in addition to affecting
the role of foreign law in American courts, may also pave the way
for recognition of international legal principles contained in
treaties ratified by the Senate. As noted above, norms included in
international agreements to which the United States is a party may
or may not have binding effect themselves, depending on whether
the agreement is self-executing. 186 Moreover, such provisions may
be written at too high a level of generality to render them capable
of providing precise, determinate rules for deciding individual
cases. At the same time, American courts may find it politically or
doctrinally difficult to rely on foreign or international tribunals'
interpretations of those terms. 187 In addition, the existence of
general liberty and equality provisions in the Constitution only
complicates the question of whether distinct meaning can be
gleaned from international agreements protecting the rights to

185.

See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198-1200 (using foreign and international law to

.confirm"

the Court's interpretation

of the Eighth Amendment).

Roper is

discussed in more detail below. See text accompanying infra notes 200-225; see also
Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 74, at 72-80 (discussing other cases in which
American courts used foreign and international law as aids in interpreting

domestic legal provisions); Heifer & Miller, supra note 180, at 82 ("Courts in the
United States have regularly used human rights treaties to inform state and federal
constitutional standards even where the treaties do not create an independent
cause of action.").
186.
187.

See supranotes 181-185 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Helfer & Miller, supra note 180, at 82 (distinguishing between the

binding nature of the text of an international agreement and foreign and
international tribunals' interpretation of that text).
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88

basic human dignity and equality.1
Even if they are not themselves formally binding or sufficiently
precise to furnish a judicially enforceable rule of decision,
substantive rights norms can still play a role in domestic rights
adjudications. In most cases other than those dealing with criminal
procedure and punishment and freedom of speech and
conscience, substantive international norms can play their most
significant role by supporting a claim that the norm at issue
constitutes a component of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause. 189 Given Lawrence's focus on more recent history
when determining whether certain conduct is protected by the
liberty guarantee, the ratification of a treaty surely supports the
claim that American society has recognized that interest as
significant. Treaty ratification reflects an explicit and deliberative
embrace of particular values by a body that has perhaps the
strongest claim to represent the nation. Thus, ratification of a
treaty containing a human rights norm reflects, as much as almost
any other governmental conduct can, a national embrace of that
norm as a component of individual freedom, even if ratification is
deemed, via a non-self-executing statement, to lack formal
domestic legal effect.
Treaty-based equality norms can be thought of as playing a
similar role, even if the different natures of substantive and equality
guaranties render the analysis slightly different. As the author has

argued elsewhere, the legal concept of equality is vacuous in the
absence of a determination that a given criterion or criteriondefined group is relevantly different, such that it is appropriate to

188. Compare, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 3,
Dec. 16,1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/
b/a-ccpr.htm, with, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996)
(explaining that gender classifications in order to be constitutional must have an

exceedingly persuasive justification").
189. Of course, this is not to minimize the role that international norms can
play in helping courts define the meaning of the criminal procedure and
punishment and freedom of speech and conscience provisions of the Bill of
Rights. Indeed, in two recent cases the Supreme Court has cited international law
as support for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. 1183; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002); see also Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995-98 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (canvassing foreign and international law to
determine the merit of a claim that excessive delay before execution violated the
Eighth Amendment). See generally infra Part IV.B.
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treat them differently. 19
But the determinations that constitute
equality law in contemporary America-e.g., that bank robbers are
relevantly different from bank account holders, that men are
(usually) not relevantly different from women, and that the
mentally retarded are (sometimes) relevantly different from
mainstream society-do not rest on traditional legal sources.
Instead, judgments about which groups and characteristics are in
fact different reflect society's value judgments, not conclusions
reached after study of standard legal sources.191
Thus, when Congress enacts equality-protecting legislation, it
should normally be thought of as playing a more direct role in
determining the meaning of equality, within broad outer
parameters set by courts.
For this reason, the author has
suggested that Congress should have especially broad power to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause, as compared with other more
substantive constitutional rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 193 However, in the case of treaties, the failure to act
by the means constitutionally prescribed for Congress to enforce
the equal protection guarantee-by a full-blown statute that
194
satisfies the standard for "appropriate" enforcement legislation 9 means that Senate ratification should not be thought of as
supplying direct meaning to the Equal Protection Clause.
Of course, the Senate's adoption of an equality norm via treaty
ratification remains quite relevant in illuminating contemporary
American attitudes toward what equality means,19 5 just as its
embrace of a particular substantive norm is highly probative of
what rights are especially valued in American society. Thus, the
Senate's adoption of an equality norm in a treaty should be highly
relevant when a court considers the meaning of equal protection.
For example, Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Grutter v. Bollinger
cited an international agreement as support for the majority's

190. See generally Araiza, supra note 19.
191.
See id. at 554-55.
192. See id. at 566-68 (explaining the relationship between judicially declared
and legislatively determined equal protection law).
193. See Araiza, supra note 173, at 61-64; see generally Araiza, supra note 19.
194. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5 ("The Congress shall have the power to
enforce, by appropriatelegislation,the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].")
(emphasis added).
195. See Araiza, supra note 19, at 542-59 (setting forth the characteristics of
Congress that make it a good source for determining the contemporary American
understanding of equality).
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analysis of an equal protection' challenge to the
1 n196 of
i University
In
plan.
action
affirmative
race-based
School's
Law
Michigan
particular, she approved in principle the majority's warning that
affirmative action plans should be of limited duration, and cited
the International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, which included an analogous limitation. 197 Even
though Justice Ginsburg questioned whether the persistence of
American racism made the majority's twenty-five-year limit too
optimistic, 198 her use of an international treaty norm to illuminate
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause reflects how
Congress, through its treaty power, can affect how courts read
constitutional provisions.
B. Non-ControllingInternationalLaw and ConstitutionalAnalysis: The
Example of the Eighth Amendment
International law may develop without formal American
Customary global norms may develop without
participation.
American consent, or in the face of American objection. Treaties
may exclude the United States, or the United States may choose
not to sign or Senate not to ratify. Alternatively, such signature or
ratification could be accompanied by a reservation that restricts the
scope of the American legal commitment. In such cases, there is
no question of the international norm formally binding United
States courts to the derogation of otherwise valid federal or state
law.
Even in such cases, international law can inform the content of
domestic constitutional law. As sketched out above, Lawrence's
focus on liberty has the potential to globalize due process analysis
by embracing as the key doctrinal concept an idea that is globally
embraced, and thus susceptible to global definition and
application. 199 That global meaning can derive not only from
foreign courts' interpretations of their own domestic laws, but also
from international law, whether treaty-based or customary.
An example-albeit not one interpreting the Due Process
Clause per se-is Roper v. Simmons, the 2005 case holding that the
196. 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (GinsburgJ., concurring).
197. Id. (citing International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106, Annex art. 2(2), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/6014, Annex art. 2(2) (Dec. 21, 1965)).
198. Id. at 344-46.
199. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
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death penalty for crimes committed by juveniles constituted cruel
and unusual punishment.2 0 After determining, based solely on
domestic
law principles,
that
juvenle-crme
.
201 the Eighth Amendment prohibited
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
juvenile-crime executions,
concluded its analysis with a canvas of world opinion on the
issue.2 02 According to the Court, foreign and international
authorities, while not "controlling," remained "instructive" for its
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, and the global consensus
20 3
against such executions "confirm [ed]" the court's conclusion.
Importantly, the Roper court conceded that the United States
had explicitly refrained from adopting an international legal norm
prohibiting juvenile executions.
Thus, if international law was to
matter to Roper, it could not be because the United States had
explicitly ratified or acquiesced in the customary development of
an international law norm that the Court could then cite either for
its own binding force or as an aid to interpreting the Eighth
Amendment. 20 5
Nevertheless, the Court found the global
2 °6
consensus against juvenile-crime execution to be "instructive.

200.
125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
201.
See id. at 1187-98.
202.
See id. at 1198-1200.
203.
Id. at 1198. But cf id. at 1206, 1215-16 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(agreeing with the majority's general approach to international and foreign law's
role in constitutional interpretation, but finding that such law could play no
confirmatory role in this case due to the lack of a domestic consensus against the
juvenile-crime death penalty).
It is unclear-and for our purposes unimportant-whether Roper viewed the
international consensus as solely a treaty-based norm or a rule of customary
international law. In either case, the norm did not apply to the United States. See
infra note 204. For that reason in either case the Court faced the question of how
to use an international law rule to inform the meaning of a domestic provision
when that norm was not formally binding on the United States.
204.
See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1194 (noting American reservation to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' provision banning juvenile
executions); see also id. at 1199 (noting American failure to ratify the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which bans juvenile-crime
executions).
205. Indeed, under standard international law doctrine, persistent objection to
a rule prevents that rule from becoming binding on the objector as a matter of
international law. See Kallins, supra note 183, at 98 (suggesting that the United
States had persistently objected to international prohibitions on the juvenile death
penalty). See generally Holning Lau, Comment, Rethinking the Persistent Objector
Doctrine in International Human Rights Law, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 495, 495 (2005)
(explaining the doctrine of the persistent objector).
206. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198 (citing international agreements banning the
juvenile-crime death penalty and noting the near-unanimity of state practice on
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This step can only be understood by concluding that the court
found global opinion-both foreign and international-relevant in
some larger sense.
A careful reading of Roper reveals how those foreign and
international authorities, even while not formally binding on U.S.
courts, nevertheless informed the Court's analysis. One of the key
issues in the Court's Eighth Amendment analysis was whether the
death penalty was being reserved for offenders who committed "'a
narrow category of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme
culpability makes them 'the most deserving of execution."- 207 In
Roper, the Court, in addition to simply citing the global consensus
against the juvenile-crime death penalty, also attributed that
consensus to
a particular
consideration, namely, "the
understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance of
young people may often be a factor in the crime. ,,208 Thus, the
Court suggested that international law mattered to the issue before
it because world opinion had recognized a factor-the moral
culpability of a class of offenders-that
constituted a part of the
••209
domestic doctrinal analysis.
Because global opinion addressed
the same concerns addressed by the cognate constitutional
provision, that opinion properly influenced, in Roper's view, the
Court's conclusion on that issue. 2 1
In turn, that conclusion
properly influenced the Court's interpretation of the domestic
constitutional provision. 2 11 One can easily draw a parallel between
the issue).
207. Id. at 1194 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
208. Id. at 1199-1200 (explaining the reasons for the United Kingdom's
decision to abolish the juvenile death penalty).
209.

See id. at 1195

(discussing juveniles'

"lack of maturity and . . .

underdeveloped sense of responsibility" as a factor that differentiates juveniles
from the worst offenders, the class to which the Constitution requires capital
punishment to be limited); see also id. at 1194 (setting forth the doctrine limiting
capital punishment to the worst offenders).
210. See also supranote 122 and accompanying text.
211. Admittedly, this analysis does not square perfectly with the Court's own
rhetoric that international sources "confirmed" its analysis of the Eighth
Amendment. Indeed, Justice O'Connor, taking the majority opinion at its word,
parted company with it by concluding that the Court's Eighth Amendment
doctrine did not support the majority's result, thus making moot any question of
international law's "confirmation" of that result. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1206, 121516 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But taking the Court's opinion at its word also
requires dealing with its citation of a substantive rationale for the global consensus
against the juvenile-crime death penalty. See id. at 1200 (majority opinion)
(reiterating the global consensus against that practice and then noting that that

consensus "rest[ed] in large part on the understanding that the instability and
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this analysis and Lawrence's conclusion that foreign law had
revealed the lack of any legitimate state
interest in suppressing the
2 12
liberty to engage in same-sex intimacy.
Still, this explanation fails to account for the unique relevance
of international, as opposed to foreign, law to the domestic
constitutional question.
Particular foreign nations may have
altered their own criminal punishment schemes in response to
conclusions about juveniles' lessened culpability, and those
nations' determinations would of course have been relevant to the
Eighth Amendment issue. Indeed, Roper itself cited the change in
British law as particularly relevant to the Eighth Amendment, given
the historic relationship between• the U.K. and213the U.S. and the
British law ancestry of the Eighth Amendment.
Justice Breyer's
2 14
dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari in Knight v. Florida,
another death penalty case, also argued that foreign law was
relevant when it "applied standards roughly comparable to our own
' 215
constitutional standards in roughly comparable circumstances."
But what about internationallaw?
Here, it may become relevant to consider a second aspect of
the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. When faced with a
claim that a particular punishment is cruel and unusual, the Court,
in addition to considering issues of proportionality and offender
culpability, also asks whether a national consensus has developed
that a particular punishment should not be imposed in a given set

emotional imbalance of young people may often be a factor in the crime").
To truly integrate this part of the majority's analysis into its international-lawas-confirmatory rhetoric, one might speculate that domestic opinion-the
"national consensus" that both the majority and Justice O'Connor searched for in
their analyses-implicitly included moral and empirical conclusions about the
relevance of juveniles' "instability and emotional imbalance." Thus, after Justice
O'Connor concluded that a domestic consensus had not gelled, she could then
conclude that global opinion on those moral and empirical issues was simply
irrelevant. Therefore, the confirmation to be found in global opinion referred
not to the ultimate question whether the juvenile-crime death penalty violated
human dignity; instead, global opinion properly spoke to the subsidiary questions
ofjuveniles' culpability. In turn, the conclusion on that question would feed into
the domestic analysis that asked whether death penalty was in fact being reserved
for those "'most deserving of execution."' Id. at 1194 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia,
506 U.S. 304, 318 (2003)).
212. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003).
213.
See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1199-1200.
214. 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (BreyerJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
215. Id. at997.
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of circumstances. 2 16 The Court has noted that the "'clearest and
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the
legislation enacted by the country's legislatures.'
This sort of "counting the states" jurisprudence obviously
parallels the process of determining the content of international
law. Customary law is determined in large part by state practice,
with a customary law norm being declared only after a practice has
been generally adhered to for a sufficient amount of time. 2 18 Of
course,
significant
differences
exist
between
the
two
communities-national and global-that make the analogy
imperfect. Most notably for purposes of this Article, customary
international law arises not just from general acceptance; instead, it
requires that the acceptance be based on some sense of legal
obligation. 2 19 By contrast, in the Eighth Amendment context there
is no obligation that state legislatures have changed their criminal
punishment schemes because of some sense that higher law
requires it.
Instead, state legislatures generally change their
sentencing schemes for policy reasons, presumably including, in
the case of sensitive issues such as the
execution of juveniles or the
220
mentally retarded, moral judgments.
Still, the fact remains that consensus, or at least agreement
among multiple parties, matters in determining the content of
both international law and the Eighth Amendment. By itself this
similarity means little for the actual meaning of the Eighth
Amendment. However, it would mean more if one assumed that
the international community counted, even to a limited degree, in
determining whether a consensus existed with regard to what
punishments were so disproportionate as to violate the human
dignity the court has recognized as the foundation of the
Amendment. 2 2 1 So understood, Ropds focus not just on the bare

216.
217.
218.
General

See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002).
Id. at 312 (quoting Penryv. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
See, e.g., DAVIDJ. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 15 (2001).
practice is insufficient for a norm to become customary law; in addition,

compliance with the norm must be based on a sense of legal obligation. See id. at
15-16.
219. See id.
220. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 323-24 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
221. See, e.g., id. at 311 ("The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment
is nothing less than the dignity of man.") (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100
(1958)).
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222
the juvenile death penalty,
fact that some nations have
•, rejected
•
223
nor even on those nations' rationales,
but also on the simple fact
224.22
224
comprehensible.2 2 5
become
would
consensus,
of global
International, notjust foreign, law, would matter.

C. InternationalCommunity and Gay Rights
The above analysis implies a broader definition of the
community whose values should matter when determini2g
consensus for purposes of deciding an Eighth Amendment issue.
In this broader understanding of community, nations play the role
otherwise assigned to states.
For gay rights advocates pressing
substantive and equality claims, the question becomes how this
globalization of community, expressed through international
law,228 can influence the interpretation 229
of domestic• constitutional
230
229
provisions such as
the
Due
Process,
Equal
Protecuon,
and Free
23 1
Speech Clauses.

Part of the answer turns on the particular right at issue, and
the type of evidence relevant to its interpretation. For example,
just as Eighth Amendment issues turn in part on society's
judgments of the culpability of different types of offenders,
substantive due process issues turn to no small degree on the social
222.
SeeRoperv. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1199-1200 (2005).
223.
See supra notes 207-211 and accompanying text.
224. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1199 (noting that every nation in the world except
the United States and Somalia has ratified the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child, and no ratifying nation has entered a reservation to the
Convention's prohibition on juvenile executions).
225.
See also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (noting, after a discussion of the
national consensus against executing the mentally retarded, that "[a]dditional
evidence . . . reflects a much broader social ... consensus" against the practice,
including, among other indicia, the "overwhelming[] disapprov[al]" of the world
community).
226. See supra Part IV.B.
227. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322-23 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(identifying state legislation as the "clearest and most reliable objective evidence
of contemporary values").
228.
But cf id. (relying on legislation as an indicator of social consensus).
229. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574-75 (2003) (relying on substantive
due process to protect right to same-sex intimacy).
230. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626-27 (1996) (relying on equal
protection to protect gays' and lesbians' equal access to government protection).
231.
See, e.g.,
Holmes v. Calif. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir.
1997) (considering First Amendment challenge to military's restrictions on service
by gays and lesbians); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech
and the U.S. Military'sDon't Ask, Don't Tell Policy, 63 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1141 (1997).
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understanding of the conduct for which constitutional protection is
sought. Between Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas, "the
right [of] homosexuals to engage in sodomy"2 32 evolved into the
right to be free of laws "touching upon the most private human
conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the
home." 233 The evolution in the court's conceptualization of the
issue surely derives in part from the change in American culture's
understanding of gay America between 1986 and 2003.234 As the
author has argued elsewhere, equality claims are most firmly
grounded in such social judgments.
In such cases, the community from which the relevant social
judgments are drawn may become more and more globalized. As
explained in an earlier part of this Article, judge-made foreign law
can play a role as respected statements of social values, made by
institutions similarly situated to American courts. 2 36 Decisions by
other foreign government bodies are similarly deserving of respect,
given their representativeness and the fact that they, again like
American courts, are faced with the problem of how best to
exercise sovereign power.
Beyond governmental entities, however, the global community
can make its judgments known through a variety of social
institutions. Just as domestic entities other than states share in the
making of social judgments that influence constitutional
meaning, 23 7 analogous foreign, transnational and international
entities can help shape a global consensus relevant to the meaning
of domestic constitutional provisions. Religious organizations can
speak to questions of moral values. 238 Social, professional and
232. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
233.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558, 566-67 (criticizing Bowers' characterization of
the issue).
234.
See, e.g., Michaelson, supra note 121 (arguing that changes in American
culture in the fifteen years after Bowers undercut that case's foundations).
235.
See Araiza, supra note 19, at 554-55 (arguing that Congress is better suited

for making judgments about whether a particular law is the result of "animus," not
the courts).
236. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (noting the belief
of military professionals that a racially diverse officer corps is necessary to the
success of the military's mission); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (noting the American
Law Institute's disapproval of laws criminalizing private consensual sexual
conduct); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (noting the views of
professional
retarded).

238.

and religious groups regarding

the execution of the

See supra note 237 and accompanying text.

mentally
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affiliational groups, by their statement and deed, can, respectively,
express and demonstrate social and professional-group attitudes
toward particular conduct or status.
Corporate policies can
reflect social attitudes, based on marketing strategies,
responsiveness to24shareholder
or employee pressure, or concerns
1
for public image.

Thus, to the extent the meaning of domestic constitutional
provisions turns in part on global understandings, the nature of the
due process and equal protection guaranties points toward
consideration not just of state practice, but of more general social
judgments of a transnational or international nature.
This
development dovetails with the ongoing evolution of international
law away from a system limited to relations between sovereign
states.24 The combination of this evolution of international law
with American courts' increased receptivity to international law in
general holds much promise for litigators seeking a way to leverage
into domestic constitutional doctrine human rights norms that are
not simply foreign, or even international, but transnational in
origin.
D. Gay Rights Claims and InternationalLaw
Given the expanded understanding of international legal
sources implied by the above analysis, gay rights litigants might be
able to find significant international support for claims that
domestic constitutional provisions protect gay rights claimants.
With regard to actual international law norms-that is, treaty,
customary, and jus cogens norms-European and United Nations
judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on
both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal

239. Id.
240. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31 (noting the benefits corporations
believe they receive from racially diverse workforces).
241.
For example, pressure from employees, shareholders, and the public have
all pushed corporations to consider improving, among other things, their
environmental policies and the working conditions of their factories in the
developing world. See, e.g., David Barkin, The Social and Environmental Impacts of the
CorporateResponsibility Movement in Mexico Since NAFTA, 30 N.C. J. INT'L L. & Com.
REG. 895 (2005) (examining "the issues and conflicts that emerged with the CRM
as well as the manifestation of these issues in Mexico in the aftermath of NAFJA's

promulgation").
242. See Spiro, supra note 80, at 2024 n.109 (noting that consent of states is not
now the only way in which binding international law arises).
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protection provisions in international texts. 24 3 Additionally, a
variety of United Nations bodies have declared sexual-orientation
discrimination to be prohibited under various international
agreements. 244 Finally, a sizable and growing number of nations
contain protections for gay and lesbian rights either in their
constitutional text or doctrine or their statutory law. 24 5 While these
country-level protections are not themselves international law in
the classic sense, and may not be sufficiently widespread to create a
rule of customary international law, 246 they would nevertheless help
comprise the background social context for judicial interpretation
of the due process and equal protection guaranties.
Beyond this international and foreign law, evidence relevant to
due process and equal protection claims can be found in the
statements and conduct of transnational social groups. As noted
above, the same religious, professional, affiliational, and corporate
groups whose actions and statements at the domestic level
comprise the social judgments informing due process and
(especially)
equal protection law exist at a transnational level as
247
well.
The development of global community norms relevant to
gay rights claims should be as relevant to American courts
interpreting due process and equal protection claims as the
development of analogous norms in the field of criminal
punishment. Indeed, Justice Scalia, surely no fan of international

243.
See Toonen v. Australia,
Comm. No. 488/1992,
U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994) (decision by the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, construing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights),
available
at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/vws488.htm;
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52 (1981) (decision by the
European Court of Human Rights, construing the European Convention on
Human
Rights
and
Fundamental
Freedoms),
available
at
http://www.worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1981/5.html; Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 186 (1991) (same); Modinos v. Cyprus, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485 (1993)
(same); Mouta v. Portugal, 1 FCR 653 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999) (European Court of
Human Rights decision finding national court's custody decision based on
applicant's sexual orientation and same-sex co-habitation, to violate the European
Convention on Human Rights' prohibition on discrimination).
244.
See Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164151.
245. See id.; see also James D. Wilets, InternationalHuman Rights Law and
Sexual Orientation,18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1 (1994).
246.
See International Gay and Lesbian Ass'n, World Legal Survey (A listing of
countries that prohibit same-sex conduct), available at http://www.ilga.info/
Information/Legal-survey/Summary%20information/countries where_same-sex
_acts%20illegal.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
247.
See supra notes 237-241 and accompanying text.
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opinion's influence on constitutional doctrine, has criticized the
idea that the Eighth Amendment possesses a distinctive character
that makes recourse to foreign and international materials
uniquely appropriate when interpreting it, citing recent due
process and equal protection cases. 2 4 If borrowing is appropriate
in the Eighth Amendment context, it should be appropriate in
these other areas as well. Even assuming that Eighth Amendment
borrowing is properly limited to the decisions of sovereigns-that
is, either foreign law, treaty law, customary international law, or jus
cogens249-such a limitation may not be as appropriate in due
process and equal protection cases, where the relevant judgments
are made at all levels of society,•250including both sovereigns and
formal and informal social groups.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a
golden age for gay rights litigants. Global opinion, even at the level
of transnational organizations, as opposed to sovereign nations or
formal international law, simply does not reflect an unambiguously
strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims. Still, momentum
for gay rights continues to build
in 251advanced industrial
•
252
democracies, both at the international,
national,
and
transnational level. 2 53 National and transnational progress is also

248. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1217, 1228 n.9 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
249. But seeAtkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (noting, as part of
the consensus against the execution of mentally retarded inmates, the views of
religious and professional organizations).
250.
Compare, e.g., id. at 312 (relying on state legislative decisions as best
indicators of consensus relating to Eighth Amendment issues), with Michaelson,
supra note 121 (arguing that underlying changes in American society's judgments
regarding homosexuality undermined the foundation of Bowers v. Hardwick), and
Araiza, supra note 19, at 554-55 (noting the fundamental role social judgments
play in equal protection doctrine).

251. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-74, 576-77 (2003) (noting
decisions of the European Court ofJustice, binding on all forty-five nations of the
European Union); Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL
164151, at *11-12 (noting European human rights legislation).
252. See Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164151, at *8-30;
Wilets, supra note 245.
253. See, e.g., Frequent Flier.com, United Rolls Out New Partner Benefits,
http://frequentflier.com/ffc-0805.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (noting United
Airline's plan eventually to offer domestic partner benefits to all employees
worldwide);
Human
Rights
Campaign
Foundation,
Work
Life,
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Search-theDatabase&Template=/
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evident in westernized developing nations. 2 54 Even if cultural
barriers make it less likely that this momentum will easily translate
into changes in other parts of the world, there is still reason to
believe that a global consensus will continue to take shape in the
coming years and decades. As it does, an evolving domestic
constitutional jurisprudence that views American social attitudes in
a globalized context should be receptive to claims that such global
opinion matters to domestic constitutional interpretation.
V.

CONCLUSION

As one commentator has written, "[a]lthough its doctrinal
place remains unsettled, international law appears poised to make
unprecedented inroads in the making of American constitutional
law."255 The same might be said of foreign law. Several factors
appear to be converging to make international and foreign law
more prominent in domestic constitutional doctrine. First, for
several years justices of the Supreme Court have been moving
toward more significant reliance on non-domestic law sources.
Second, the Court's embrace in Lawrence of a more expansive due
process jurisprudence, one that echoes Eighth Amendment
doctrine in its willingness to consider non-domestic sources of law,
makes those non-domestic sources more relevant to domestic
constitutional interpretation.
Because due process and, even more so, equal protection
decisions rest on background social judgments, the type of nondomestic law relevant to due process and equal protection
decisions is more expansive than formal international law and
foreign nation practice. As transnational groups seek to influence
American constitutional doctrine, both for its own sake and

CustomSource/WorkNet/srch.cfm&searchtypeid=l&searchSubTypelD=l
(listing,
among other entities that provide domestic partner benefits and have sexual
orientation non-discrimination provisions, the International Monetary Fund,
Greenpeace, and Human Rights Watch).
254. See, e.g., Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL
164151, at *12-13 (citing law from South Africa and Colombia); id. at *28 (citing
law from Fiji and Ecuador); id. at *29 (citing law from Costa Rica).

255.

Spiro, supra note 80, at 2026.

256.
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct 1183 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344, 348 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S.
990, 995-98 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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because of its worldwide persuasive value, they can be expected to
present arguments to courts more frequently, drawing attention to
whatever relevant global consensus exists on the issue at hand.
This third development should provide American courts with both
the information and the legal argumentation they have indicated
they would welcome.
Again, none of this is to suggest that American courts will
jettison formal reliance on American constitutional provisions, in
favor of deciding cases based on international norms. 2 57 However,
as consciousness of a global legal community recognizing certain
rights grows, American courts will no doubt feel increased pressure
to conform domestic doctrine to the contours of those rights, at
least where American doctrine is neither self-consciously different
258
259
than,
nor inconsistent with,
the global view. In that way,
American constitutional doctrine surely will become increasingly
globalized. This can only redound to the benefit of gay rights
advocates, given that foreign nations, foreign opinion, and the
world community as a whole have largely superseded the 2United
60
States as leading protectors of the rights of gays and lesbians.

257. Cf Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 736-37 (2004) (expressing
concern that recognition of a customary rule of law against arbitrary detention
would, among other things, allow suits under the Alien Tort Statute to supplant
claims under the Fourth Amendment or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)).
258. See, e.g., Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1217, 1226-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(discussing uniquely American jurisprudence relating to search and seizure and
religious establishment fights).
259. In the case of the free speech, for example, American constitutional
jurisprudence elevates the individual's right to speak over other individuals' rights
to be free of insult or verbal oppression. See, e.g., Kim Rappaport, In the Wake of
Reno v. ACLU: The Continuing Struggle in Westernized Democracies with Internet
Censorship and Freedom of Speech Online, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 765, 768 (1998).
260. See, e.g., Heather Mason Kiefer, Public Opinion Favors Gay Rights in Britain,
Canada, GALLOP
POLL, May
24,
2005,
http://poll.gallup.com/content
/default.aspx?CI=16456 (indicating stronger support for gay rights in general and
same-sex marriage in particular in Great Britain and Canada than in the United
States); International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Comm'n, Where You Can
Marry: Global Summary of Registered Partnership, Domestic Partnership, and
Marriage
Laws,
http://www.iglhrc.org/site/iglhrc/content.php?type=1 &id=91
(last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (noting foreign jurisdictions allowing some form of
same-sex legal union); United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Homosexuality and
the Armed Forces, http://www.mod.uk/issues/homosexuality/index.htm
(last
visited Nov. 20, 2005) (noting change to British policy regarding gays' ability to
serve in the U.K military); Kim Krisberg, Life for Israeli Gays Pushes Forward Despite
Turmoil, WASHINGTON BLADE ONLINE, March 15, 2002, http://www.aegis.com
/news/wb/2002/WB020312.html (noting gay rights provisions in Israeli law).

